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I. INTRODUCTION
This Article offers suggestions about the ways in which the host of
a settlement conference can function most effectively. These suggestions
are directed towards judges, but, for the most part, should be useful
to anyone who serves as the neutral in a negotiation process. The results
of the A.B.A. survey of "Litigators' Views About Appropriate Roles
and Effective Techniques for Federal Judges" [A.B.A. survey] dem-
onstrate that the vast majority of litigators believe that judges are in
a position to make valuable contributions to the settlement process.' In
fact, lawyers want judges to become more assertively involved in set-
tlement than has been the norm in most courts in the past.2 It seems
clear that judges are going to be under continuing and increasing pressure
to make settlement work a major part of their job description. Thus it
is important for judges to think systematically and carefully about how
they perform this important function.
This Article begins by discussing the mind set, or attitudes, that are
most appropriate for a judicial host of a settlement negotiation. Then
it discusses factors judges should consider when identifying the points
in the pretrial period when a settlement conference is sufficiently likely
to be productive to warrant the effort. Thereafter, the discussion will
address different ways judges might format or structure settlement
conferences, and comment on the pros and cons of each. The next
section consists of a detailed prescription for conducting the kind of
settlement conference that some judges have found to be most pro-
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ductive3 Along the way, the Article will suggest numerous ways to
respond constructively to problem behavior by lawyers or clients and
how to break negotiation logjams. The latter section will include nu-
merous examples of ways the host of the conference can damage the
prospects of achieving settlement or alienate participants in the process.
Many of these examples are based on mistakes I have made in settlement
conferences. By openly discussing these errors, I hope to help others
avoid them. I also hope that this section of the Article bears witness
to the sincerity of my disclaimer that I enjoy any special success as a
settlement facilitator. I claim no corner on the insight, wisdom, or self-
control markets; I know many judges who are more effective settlement
facilitators than I am. If I have any standing to write this Article, it
derives from my dislike of failure; I have spent considerable time trying
to figure out why settlement conferences I have hosted have failed and
what I might do to reduce the odds that such failures will relcur.
Judges who are looking for secret tricks or for quick and dirty
solutions to settlement problems will search these pages in vain. There
is no magic formula for settling cases. Instead, the keys to judicial
effectiveness in settlement negotiations are rather straightforward: solid
preparation, good timing, a balanced blend of self-assurance and humility,
the ability to listen and to listen creatively, sensitivity to the needs and
moods of other people, thoughtful substantive analysis, patience, tenacity,
flexibility, and the good fortune to be dealing with attorneys and parties
who are rational.
II. THE APPROPRIATE MIND SET
Before turning to a discussion of specific approaches and techniques,
it is important to emphasize a few general points about the judicial role
in settlement. Judges do not settle lawsuits. The parties and their lawyers
settle lawsuits. Judges can facilitate the process, can help remove ob-
stacles to communication, and can help refine the parties' analyses, but
settlement judges do not have the power to force any litigant or lawyer
to accept either their views or a settlement proposal they feel is eminently
reasonable. Because they do not have the power to assure that parties
reach settlement, judges should not feel responsible every time a set-
tlement is not achieved.
It is important that the judge not feel an exaggerated sense of
responsibility to reach a settlement. Such a feeling can make the judge
intense and impatient and cause the judge to behave counterproductively.
Anger is virtually never an appropriate emotion for a settlement facil-
itator to express. Moreover, a judge who views every settlement con-
ference that does not close with an agreement as a personal failure will
3. Author's personal experience.
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soon lose interest in hosting settlement conferences. Most settlement
conferences do not result in immediate agreements. But the A.B.A.
survey shows that judges can make subtle and significant contributions
even in conferences that seem to go nowhere. 4 In many cases, the parties
cannot reach an agreement in the first conference; two or more con-
ferences are often essential. A judge who expects too much either will
burn out before the follow-up conference or will be unproductively
impatient during the conference. It is wiser for the judge to put less
pressure on himself, to be prepared to meet with the parties more than
once, and to walk away unencumbered by any sense of failure if the
parties, after his good faith efforts, do not come to terms.
An effective judicial host of a settlement conference also must bring
to the process a delicately balanced blend of self-assurance and humility.
The self-assurance is necessary to induce the lawyers and the parties
to take seriously the judge's analysis, valuation and suggestions. A judge
who deprecates himself excessively, or who constantly reminds the
lawyers and parties about the limitations on his knowledge and expe-
rience, can needlessly undermine his capacity to help the parties find
common ground. There is little risk that the lawyers will blindly accept
the settlement judge's analysis or recommendations. Instead, counsel
will add the judge's views to a hopper full of other views and consid-
erations, all of which will play roles in determining what recommen-
dations the lawyers make to their clients during the negotiations. Given
the fact that most litigators bring a well-developed sense of independence
to settlement conferences, judges should not feel constrained to belittle
themselves as part of an effort to avoid being unduly influential.
At the same time, it is important that judges who host settlement
conferences preserve internally an accurate sense of their own fallibility.
A judge who arrogantly assumes that he knows all there is to know
about a case or the parties' situations, or that the only terms of settlement
that are appropriate are those h.e recommends, is likely to provoke
counterproductive reactions from counsel and litigants. Moreover, the
cases are rare indeed when a settlement judge knows more about the
situation than the lawyers and the parties. A good settlement judge
begins the conference with an open mind, ready to learn from the people
who have lived with the case for a substantial period. To be effective
in this environment, a judge must take steps to ensure that the lawyers
and parties perceive that he or she is approaching the settlement dynamic
with an open mind, prepared to be educated, and ready to be persuaded
by the side with the most compelling arguments.5 This perception will
4. See W. BRAZIL, supra note 1.
5. Id. at 45.
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encourage the kind of behavior from counsel that is most likely to make
the conference productive: using reasoning from evidence and legal
authority to try to justify their client's position on the settlement issue.
The major point here is that the mind set that is appropriate for
hosting a settlement conference is very different from the mind set thatjudges develop when presiding at trial or contested hearings. In settlement
settings, the judge must be much more patient, much more open to
letting the lawyers meander, both intellectually and emotionally, and
much more willing to demonstrate to counsel both knowledge of the
case and openness of mind. These admonitions are especially important
for judges who conduct settlement conferences during breaks in busy
trial or motion schedules. 6
A style of intellectual aggressiveness that may be appropriate at trial
is not appropriate for a settlement conference, especially for the early
phases of such a conference. Instead of opening with an intellectual
edge, the judge should open the settlement conference gently, setting
a tone that is relaxed and encourages the participants to feel that the
judge has not formed rigid opinions in advance. The host of the con-
ference wants the participants to perceive him as ready to listen to each
side, to be educated, and to move toward an assessment of the parties'
positions only gradually, only after giving thoughtful consideration to a
host of factors - some of which may have nothing to do with law or
evidence. The judge hosting a settlement conference must be prepared
to give the parties room to meander, time to move (emotionally and
intellectually) through a series of positions and postures. A settlement
conference often is like a ritualized dance: forcing the tempo ruins the
effect.
It is especially important to let the parties (really the lawyers, in
most instances) talk at the outset, to let them tell their side of the
story, perhaps discursively, so that they feel that they have been truly
heard before the judge begins forming opinions or intellectually "pushing
them around." In other words, the beginning of a settlement conference
is not the place for the judge to dive in and head right for the center.
It is not the place for the judge to go for the jugular, as she might do
in a contested hearing on a busy calendar. It is not the place for the
6. I know from frustrating personal experience that it is very difficult to shift stylistic
and intellectual gears when I have been sitting on the bench most of the day, deciding
contested matters, then turn to host a settlement conference. When I am on the bench
I am under considerable time pressure to move through my busy docket. I respond to
that pressure by becoming intellectually aggressive, forcing counsel to get right to the
center of things and to efficiently explicate the key issues. I am not particularly sensitive
to subtle emotional shifts and am not patient with long-winded explanations. From the
outset of every hearing I use my mind assertively to control the agenda and the pace of
the proceedings, to focus the issues, and to press for answers to important questions.
4
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judge to prove that she is in intellectual control. Instead, the judge
must make the participants feel that the settlement conference is their
conference, that it is geared to their needs, that the judge is a resource
for them to use, and that they are not annoyances that threaten to
disrupt the judge's schedule.
Thus there is a substantial difference between the tone and style a
judge brings to a settlement conference and the tone and style in which
she conducts most other judicial business.
To be effective, a judge must self-consciously shift into a much lower
and slower gear when she moves into a settlement conference. This kind
of shift is very difficult to make. Judges should not underestimate it.
They should try to leave enough time between events that require such
different approaches so that they can make the appropriate tonal transition.
III. TIMING SETTLEMENT CONFERENCES
There is no consensus among lawyers about the point at which a
settlement conference is most likely to be productive. 7 That lack of
consensus no doubt reflects, in part, the fact that the best time for a
judicially hosted settlement conference can vary from case to case,
depending on a host of factors about whose dynamics little is known.
There is no science in this business. Instead, judges must make difficult
decisions about how much of their resources they are prepared to commit
to the settlement process, then, with respect to individual cases, they
must make educated guesses about when to begin the judicial effort to
facilitate negotiations. The following paragraphs contain ideas that judges
might consider when making such educated guesses.
At the outset, it is important to emphasize that it often takes more
than one settlement conference for the parties to reach an agreement.
Judges who are seriously interested in promoting settlements should
expect to host two settlement conferences per case, sometimes more. A
judge who makes her plans with this expectation is much more likely
to schedule the first settlement conference early in the life of the case,
hoping that it will bring the matter to an early, efficient resolution and
knowing that even if no agreement is reached the early conference can
contribute greatly to the efficiency of the case development process.
Many lawyers and judges believe that the single factor that contributes
most to encouraging settlement is an imminent and fixed trial date.'
7. W. BRAzIL., supra note 1, at 77.
8. See Schuck, The Role of Judges in Settling Complex Cases: The Agent Orange
Example, 53 U. CH. L. REv. 337, 346 (1986); Peckham, A Judicial Response to the
Cost of Litigation: Case Management, Two Stage Discovery Planning and Alternative
Dispute Resolution, 37 RUrGEms L. REv. 253, 268 (1985).
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Lawyers who believe that they can move the trial date, or that the
court will be forced to move it to accommodate other cases on its
docket, will not feel the same pressure to "fish or cut bait" as lawyers
who know that their case will go out on the scheduled date. Thus,
credible trial dates are one key to creating an environment that is
conducive to settlement. A court that has decided that cost-effective
use of judicial resources generally permits only one serious effort per
case to help the parties reach a settlement should set its settlement
conferences late in the pretrial period. At this point, the parties have
completed most of their discovery, a firm trial date looms close, and
perhaps the lawyers have not done their expensive, last minute
preparations.
Scheduling the conference just before these eleventh hour expenses
are incurred might leave additional money available for the settlement
kitty. It also might reduce the odds that the parties and lawyers will
become more emotionally committed to their version of the facts. To
prepare psychologically for trial, litigators and litigants often "pump
themselves up" during the final days of frenzied work. Once they develop
these "heads of steam," it may be more difficult for them to be objective
about the case and to respond flexibly to settlement proposals. On the
other hand, there probably are cases in which counsel or litigants do
not fully appreciate the weaknesses of their position until the imminence
of the trial forces them to go through the evidence and law systematically
and specifically. A judge who senses that one or more of the lawyers
will not do his homework until forced to do so by the final pretrial
conference or by some other last minute event should consider using
part of the time set aside for that event for settlement negotiations.
Judges who are prepared to consider scheduling settlement conferences
earlier in the pretrial period face the difficult task of identifying the
kinds of cases or situations in which an earlier conference is sufficiently
likely to be productive to warrant the effort. Settlement conferences
can be "productive" even when the parties leave without reaching an
agreement. Settlement conferences can save litigants money by narrowing
areas in dispute and equipping counsel to tailor their discovery efforts
to the real informational needs of the case. An early settlement con-
ference can open channels of communication across party lines that can
make case development more efficient. A judge can suggest new lines
of inquiry or perspectives during an early settlement conference that
counsel can pursue after the conference. One advantage of an earlier
settlement conference is that it leaves counsel with time to respond to
what they learn during the conference, such as developing information
that will persuade the other side to change its position, or re-evaluating
the strength of key evidence on which they would rely at trial.
When soheduling settlement conferences before the eleventh hour,
[Vol. 3:1 1987]
HOSTING SETTLEMENT CONFERENCES
judges should look for major events whose expense could be avoided
by an early settlement. It might make sense, for example, to set a
settlement conference just before a series of depositions of experts, or
before briefs must be filed for motions seeking summary judgment or
class certification. Similarly, a settlement conference scheduled just
before an expensive accounting would be undertaken might be well
timed. Scheduling conferences just before major events, or just before
rulings on major motions, also can be effective if the litigants are risk-
averse: some people are more flexible and responsive when negotiating
under a cloud of significant uncertainty. Other litigants are more likely
to negotiate seriously only when the dust has cleared, that is, only when
they know how the court has ruled on the key motion, or how well the
competing experts testify during their depositions. For this kind of
litigant, the more propitious time for the conference is right after the
major ruling or event. The difficulty, of course, is distinguishing the
risk averse litigants or lawyers from those who are more comfortable.
"dealing" in a known environment. A judge facing this quandry might
offer the litigants a choice of times for their initial settlement conference,
one time just before the major event, the other after the major event
has been completed and a ruling issued. The option elected by the
parties may offer a clue about their level of risk aversion.
Scheduling settlement conferences relatively early in the pretrial
period is likely to make more sense in cases whose value is not substantial,
in which the cost of discovery is likely to be out of proportion to the
ultimate value of the case, or in which the amount of damages is
predictable within a relatively modest range and is not likely to change
significantly through time. Initial experiences with the Early Neutral
Evaluation program in the Northern District of California suggest that
one kind of case that is well-suited to early settlement efforts is a
straightforward action on a written contract in which the damages are
either liquidated or relatively easy to calculate. 9 In these cases, the only
real issue is liability and this issue often turns on relatively common-
sense interpretations of language in the contracts.10 In such a situation,
counsel and court should be in a position to value the case for settlement
purposes without extensive discovery. If one or more of the parties claim
that the terms of the written agreements were modified orally, counsel
should be ready to negotiate seriously after taking the depositions of
the people who have knowledge about the existence or content of the
oral terms.
9. Magistrate Brazil helps administer the program. General Order No. 26, U.S. Dist.
Ct., N.D. Cal., sets forth the rules.
10. Brazil, Kahn, Newman & Gold, Early Neutral Evaluation: An Experimental Effort
to Expedite Dispute Resolution, 69 JUDICATURE 279, 280 (1986).
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In contrast, early settlement negotiations may not be feasible in cases
that involve a client with serious personal injuries whose condition has
not stabilized or whose effects remain unclear. If the plaintiff might
require extensive additional surgery, or if his employability turns on
how he responds to medical treatment or rehabilitation that has not
been completed, attorneys are not likely to feel that they can fairly
value the case. When faced with such a situation, the judge should
pressure counsel to be as specific as possible about what additional
information they need before they can value the case for settlement
and when they are likely to acquire this information. The judge can
then set a schedule under which the lawyers will acquire the information
and fix the date of the settlement conference so that it follows promptly
thereafter.
As the above examples suggest, a judge who is trying to decide how
best to time a settlement conference should attempt to ascertain whether
the damages aspect of the case has essentially stabilized and whether
the parties have access to the other essential information they need to
rationally assess the value of the case. Judges should be skeptical of
generalized assertions made by counsel that they will not be prepared
to discuss settlement until they have completed all of their discovery.
There are a great many cases, especially those of a relatively routine
nature, which counsel should be able to assess reliably with only a
modest amount of discovery. Judges should push counsel to focus on
the information that is central to valuing the case, then schedule
settlement negotiations for a date shortly after the period required to
acquire that central information. There usually is no need to wait until
every last contention interrogatory has been fully answered.
IV. THE TWO-STAGE APPROACH TO DISCOVERY PLANNING
Building from suggestions made by experienced litigators, Chief Judge
Robert F. Peckham of the United States District Court for the Northern
District of California has developed an approach to discovery planning
that is designed to prepare cases as efficiently as possible for meaningful
settlement discussions." By standing order, Chief Judge Peckham com-
pels counsel to identify, in written statements submitted before the initial
status conference (usually 120 days after the complaint has been filed),
the key or core discovery that counsel need to complete in order to
develop a relatively reliable valuation of the case.' 2 During the initial
status conference the Judge discusses the parties' various submissions
11. Peckham, supra note 8, and author's personal conversations with Judge Peckham.
12. Id. at 255. Cf. Peckham, The Federal Judge as a Case Manager: The New Role
in Guiding a Case from Filing to Disposition, 69 CALIF. L. REv. 770, 780 (1981).
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in response to this directive; his goal is to develop a consensus about
what information really is needed before serious efforts to settle the
case can be undertaken. 3 After considering the parties' proposals, he
makes suggestions of his own, sometimes pointing to ways counsel can
acquire or share the information they need informally and at less
expense,' 4 sometimes suggesting that counsel may be in a position to
go forward with productive settlement negotiations without first com-
pleting all the discovery they had initially outlined.'
After completing this kind of discussion, the Judge enters an order
that specifies the core discovery counsel will do during the first pretrial
stage and the kinds of information counsel will share informally.' 6 Most
significantly, this order also sets the date for a settlement conference,
to follow shortly after the conclusion of this first stage (core) discovery.
The Judge reassures the parties that if they are not able to reach a
settlement after completing the core discovery he will permit them to
conduct such reasonable additional discovery as is necessary to prepare
for trial.' 7
Thus, by working with counsel, the Judge tries to focus discovery in
the first stage on the center of the case, developing the information the
parties need to rationally discuss settlement but postponing the more
detailed and peripheral discovery that counsel might be required to do
if the case was to go to trial. This approach to structuring the pretrial
period is designed to offer the litigants an opportunity to save money;
it permits them to try to reach a settlement after spending only as
much money on discovery as is really essential.
Chief Judge Peckham's two-stage approach to structuring the pretrial
period has been used by other chambers in the Northern District of
Californias and has been endorsed in the Final Report of the Second
Circuit Committee on the Pretrial Phase of Civil Litigation, submitted
June 11, 1986, by the chair of the Committee, Professor Maurice
Rosenberg of Columbia University.
V. PREPARATION FOR THE SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE
A judge's effectiveness during a settlement conference depends in
large part on how well prepared he is. A judge who is perceived by
counsel as having a clear understanding of the case enters the process
13. Peckham, supra note 8, at 268.
14. Peckham, supra note 12, at 780.
15. Peckham, supra note 8, at 268.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Peckham, supra note 12, at 776.
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with an important credibility edge. Acquiring this clear understanding
is not always a simple task. One method is to require the parties to
submit detailed written statements at least a week before the conference.
A second method is to have a law clerk do some well-focused research
in the relevant areas of the law.19
In most cases judges should require counsel to submit detailed set-
tlement conference statements that give the judicial host a full sense
of the environment in which the negotiations will take place. With an
eye toward improving the quality of the submissions, the judges may
order that such written statements be treated as confidential, not filed
in the case file, and not submitted to other parties.20 The judge's standard
order sets forth a list of subjects the lawyers are to address in these
submissions and identifies the kinds of documents or exhibits to be
attached. It obviously is important to require counsel to describe spe-
cifically the evidence that supports their theory of the case and to
document their damages claims. The preconference order also should
explicitly require counsel to attach to their statements any documents
that might enhance the productivity of the negotiations, such as contracts,
key correspondence or memos, reports of experts, photographs, papers
that evidence special damages and selected pages from deposition tran-
scripts or responses to other discovery. The usefulness of the submissions
about the damages aspect of the case can be enhanced by requiring
the lawyers to include, when practicable, information about the settle-
ment or judgment value of comparable cases. The preconference order
also should require the attorneys to attach copies of helpful judicial
opinions from other cases if difficult legal issues are likely to play a
significant role in the negotiations. Counsel often will fail to bring to
the conference the kinds of documents described in this paragraph unless
they are clearly required to do so and many conferences flounder when
analysis comes to an abrupt halt because the key materials are not
available. A settlement judge who wants to help the lawyers reason
toward a solution to their problems often cannot do so unless he has
direct access to the basic information on which the case will turn.
The settlement conference order also should compel counsel to de-
scribe any negotiations that already have occurred, detailing demands
and offers and the reasons they have been rejected. It is very important
that the host of the conference know as much as possible about the
history of any settlement negotiations that may already have been
conducted in the case. A judge who does not appear sufficiently sensitive
19. Two sources that are useful in appropriate circumstances are PERSONAL INJURY
VALUATION HANDBOOKS (1964) and The Nat'l Jury Verdict Rev. & Analysis (published
monthly).
20. Author's personal experience.
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to how much the parties already have offered or how much ground
they already have given up can alienate them.21 Knowing the positions
parties have taken in the past, and how much they already have moved,
can be especially important when one side feels that it has demonstrated
much more flexibility and good faith than the other. This knowledge
also can prevent the embarrassment caused by pushing for a solution
that has been considered in great detail, and rejected, in prior sessions.
A judge who knows the history of the positions taken by the parties
prior to the conference also is in a position to try to prevent the parties
from retreating during the conference to positions that are less generous
than offers or demands they made in earlier sessions. Sometimes lawyers
will try to use a judge to sell a proposal that their opponents have
already rejected emphatically and with good reason. Such tactics are
capable of harming an unknowing judge's credibility.
A judge should attempt to understand as much as possible about the
situations of the parties outside the confines of the litigation. This kind
of understanding can equip the judge to suggest creative terms of
settlement. Equally important, understanding the parties' situations out-
side the litigation enables the judge to appreciate the magnitude of the
impact of various proposed solutions on the parties. Sensitivity to these
relative impacts can improve the judge's relations with the litigants and
can protect the judge from suggesting "solutions" that are either im-
possible or too painful to be practicable.
Special preparation for the conference can help with some of these
potentially more difficult matters. For example, when the judge has
reason to believe that limitations on a litigant's resources are likely to
play an important role in the negotiations the judge should have the
counsel of the litigant relay the judge's request that the litigant submit
financial information to the judge in confidence and under penalty of
perjury for in camera consideration.22 These kinds of submissions may
include copies of income tax returns, bank records, loan documents, and
other materials. They can be very useful in forming a recommendation
about what the litigant might be able to contribute to a settlement
without being forced into bankruptcy.
Since it is important to understand the procedural posture of the
case at the time of the negotiations, the settlement judge's preconference
order also should require counsel to identify in their written settlement
conference statements the dates that have been set for trial, for discovery
and motion cut-off, and for hearing on any potentially significant motions.
The judge also should determine whether or not potentially expensive
21. Id.
22. Id.
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trial preparation events are looming. This kind of information can be
an important source of financial leverage, especially if the parties'
positions on settlement end up being relatively close. The preconference
order also should require counsel to attach to their statements copies
of any significant orders or opinions that already have been entered in
the case. Such orders can have significant implications for what parties
will be permitted to do at trial and, in courts operated on the individual
assignment system, may contain clues about how the assigned judge
might approach important issues at trial.
Getting lawyers to submit timely and truly useful written settlement
conference statements is no easy task. Even though I issue a special
order well in advance of every settlement conference I host, and even
though that order explicitly requires counsel to submit their confidential
statements (for my eyes only) seven days prior to the date set for the
conference, I often do not receive the statements until the day before
the event. Many of the statements cover the mandated subjects in such
conclusory terms that they are almost valueless. Finally, key documents
are often unattached. The only remedies for such problems are sanctions,
which may be counterproductive, or having a clerk call counsel a week
before the conference and pressure them to submit substantial statements
and useful exhibits. Such calls also offer good opportunities to remind
counsel that they are required to bring their client, or a representative
with full settlement authority, to the conference, unless the judge has
explicitly permitted clients to satisfy this duty by being available by
telephone during the conference.
Another important aspect of preparation for the conference involves
making sure that all the people who will be necessary to conduct complete
negotiations are present or readily available. This category of people
includes the senior lawyers on the case, a representative of the client
with full settlement authority, and a representative of the insurance
carrier if the case involves insurance. Since a majority of the lawyers
surveyed by the A.B.A. indicate that settlement conferences are signif-
icantly more likely to be productive if the clients are required to attend,
it is important in most cases to require the clients' attendance. 23 Again,
it is important for the judges to be sure that any person who appears
on behalf of an insurance carrier has sufficient authority to settle the
case; if the case involves a potentially large settlement, the judge may
want to take special steps to ensure that the representative of the carrier
is not merely a front-line adjuster, but a supervisor or vice-president.
If the conference may include difficult or controversial economic cal-
culations, the judge may require the presence of accountants or actuaries
23. W. BRAZIL, supra note 1, at 102-05.
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who can work out proposed solutions and explain the underlying as-
sumptions during the conference. There may even be occasions when it
makes sense to have present an expert or two from some other field.
If the value of the case turns on the credibility of a key percipient
witness, the judge might consider arranging to have that person available
so the judge can informally interview him and form an impression about
how convincing his testimony will be at trial. If the depositions of key
witnesses have been videotaped, the judge might find it useful to view
well-edited portions of those tapes prior to or during the conference.
VI. LAWYERS' FEELINGS ABOUT THE PROPRIETY OF DIFFERENT
SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE FORMATS
There are several different schools of thought on the question of how
judges should structure settlement conferences. This issue can raise
questions about propriety and about effectiveness. The following dis-
cussion will address this subject from both perspectives, beginning with
concerns about propriety.
Responses to the A.B.A. survey suggest that a small percentage of
the bar believes that it is improper for a judge to take any steps to
encourage settlement. 24 While not widespread, this view seems to be
held with considerable intensity by some lawyers (perhaps 5% of the
bar).25 The basis for these strong feelings, however, is not clear. No
code of judicial conduct of which I am aware even intimates that judges
should play no role in the settlement process. It is possible that the
hostility that a small minority of lawyers feels toward judicial involvement
in the settlement process derives either from a general philosophic
objection to judges playing anything but the traditional passive role or
from bad experiences individual lawyers have had with judges who
pressured them to endorse a settlement that the lawyer thought was
unfair. The judge who faces such hostility and decides to go forward
with a settlement conference should acknowledge the lawyer's concerns
and reassure him that he has no intention of pressuring either him or
his client to do anything against their will.
More complex questions about the propriety of the judicial role arise
when the settlement judge uses a format during the conference that
includes private caucusing with one side or one lawyer at a tinie.
Sensitivity among lawyers concerning ex parte communications with a
settlement judge is by no means uniform around the country. In northern
California, where private caucusing with the settlement judge is a well
24. Id. at 6.
25. Id.
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established procedure in state and federal court, only a small percentage
of the bar expresses concern about the propriety of this practice.26 In
northern Florida, however, an appreciably higher percentage of litigators
question the propriety of conducting a settlement conference in this
way.27 Responses to the A.B.A. survey suggest that when the judge who
is hosting the settlement conference will not preside at trial, only 6%
of the litigators in northern California believe it is improper for that
judge to meet privately with one side or lawyer at a time during the
negotiations.2 8 In northern Florida, however, about half of the responding
litigators feel that private caucusing is improper in such a setting, even
when the judge who is hosting the conference would not try the case.29
The percentage of lawyers who challenge the propriety of private cau-
cusing increases in both jurisdictions when the host of the conference
also would preside during a subsequent jury trial if the parties failed
to settle the case. s0 Even in this context, however, less than one in four
of the northern California lawyers feel that private caucusing by the
judge during the settlement conference is improper.3 In northern Florida,
by contrast, almost half of the polled lawyers condemn this practice.3 2
These regional differences of opinion do not appear to be based on
differences in codes of judicial conduct. The only relevant provisions in
the applicable codes are essentially identical, prohibiting "ex parte or
other communications concerning a pending or impending proceeding.
. . except as authorized by law."' 33 I know of no authority, either from
decided cases or from opinions issued by ethics committees, that pro-
pounds that private caucusing by a judge in the context of a settlement
conference is not "authorized by law."
Regional differences of opinion about the propriety of a settlement
judge meeting privately with one lawyer at a time appear to be based
on differences in "local legal culture," meaning practices that have been
informally established and to which the bar has grown accustomed but
that are not compelled by formal rules. As indicated above, private
caucusing by the settlement judge is a well-established practice in the
state courts of northern California, and the results of the A.B.A. survey
indicate that lawyers in that region now heartily endorse this practice.3
4
26. W. BRAZIL, supra note 1, at 107.
27. Id. at 108.
28. Id. at 74.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 107.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 72.
33. MODEL STANDARDS, CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 3, §A(4) (1984).
34. W. BRAZIL, supra note 1, at 73. In fact, when I host settlement conferences, I
often ask the lawyers to choose the structure they would like to use, and they virtually
always opt for private caucusing.
[Vol. 3:1 1987]
HOSTING SETTLEMENT CONFERENCES
The differences between northern California and northern Florida in
local legal culture may have their roots, in part, in one important
difference in the way the state courts are operated in the two regions.
In northern California, most of the state courts are run under the master
calendar system. 5 Under that system, different aspects of the cases are
handled by different judges.3 6 Thus, the judge who handles pretrial law
and motion does not preside at trial. Similarly, the judge who is assigned
to host the settlement conference would not preside at trial if the case
went that far. In Florida, however, most of the state courts operate
under the individual assignment system. 37 Promptly after being filed
each individual case is assigned to an individual judge, who is responsible
for handling all aspects of that case from initial status conference
through trial.3 1 Moreover, the Florida courts have not developed a system
for sending settlement conferences to specialist settlement judges or to
judges who will have no other contact with the case. 39 Thus, in most
of the state courts in Florida, the judge who hosts the settlement
conference is also the judge who would preside at trial. This fact makes
both judges and lawyers less comfortable with the assigned judge holding
secret meetings with one side at a time, even under the rubric of
settlement negotiations. In such an environment, private caucusing cre-
ates the risk that the judge who will preside at trial will learn things
in the secret sessions that would be inadmissable under the rules of
evidence and that might influence rulings that might be made at the
trial. This risk does not exist in most of the California courts, in which
the settlement judge has no other contact with the case. This fact may
help to account for the substantially greater enthusiasm that litigators
in northern California feel for settlement conferences that are structured
around a series of private caucuses.
Obviously, judges should be sensitive to expectations in the local bar,
especially if these expectations are the product of long-established prac-
tices of local courts. A judge who is considering using a procedure to
which the local bar is not accustomed should explain that he is aware
that the procedure he would like to use is not well established locally
and may give rise to some concern, but then should go on to explain
why he would like to experiment with the procedure, specifically pointing
out the benefits or advantages it promises for the lawyers and their
clients. A judge in this situation also should explain that the procedure
35. W. BRAZIL, supra note 1, at 72.
36. Id.
37. FLA. STAT. ANN. §43.26(2)(a) (West 1974).
38. Id.
39. Id.
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he contemplates has been used successfully in other parts of the country,
where lawyers are enthusiastic about it.
VII. COMPARING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF DIFFERENT SETTLEMENT
CONFERENCE FORMATS
A. Private Caucusing: One Lawyer at a Time
Having experimented with three different formats for settlement
conferences, and having discussed the matter with lawyers with wide
experience in settlement negotiations, I have concluded that the structure
that is likely to be most productive in the widest range of circumstances
revolves around a series of meetings in which the judge confers privately
with one lawyer at a time. Successful conferences often involve more
than these private caucuses. The judge may open the conference by
meeting briefly with all counsel and parties; he may call the lawyers
together at various junctures during the negotiations; he may meet
privately with a lawyer and client; and he may close the conference
with a group meeting. But most of the real work is likely to be done,
and most of the progress is likely to be made, in the private caucuses
involving the judge and the lawyer(s) for one party or side. The following
paragraphs set forth the explanation of the view that the private cau-
cusing system is the most productive of the commonly-used formats for
judicially hosted settlement conferences. They will also describe the
principal advantages and disadvantages of other settlement negotiation
structures.
When a settlement judge meets privately with one lawyer at a time,
he can set an informal tone and can encourage counsel to interact with
him as an intellectual peer. He can encourage counsel to relax and to
discuss the case and the settlement possibilities more openly and more
frankly than would be likely if his client or opposing counsel were
present. Many lawyers feel increased pressure to "perform" or to "pos-
ture," or to "play tough," when their client or their adversary is watching.
Litigators understandably want their clients to feel that they are getting
their money's worth.40 They also want opposing counsel to view them
as competent and confident, as vigorous advocates and demanding
negotiators.41 For these reasons, litigators generally do not like to make
concessions about the merits or value of the case in the presence of
opposing counsel. 42 By meeting privately with one lawyer at a time, a
judge can reduce these obstacles to productive settlement discussions.
40. Author's personal experience.
41. Id.
42. Id.
16
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A lawyer who is meeting privately with the judge is likely to be more
flexible and less verbally ornate. Moreover, discovery and other pretrial
activities can generate frictions or animosities between lawyers that can
interfere with settlement negotiations. One of the virtues of the private
caucus system is that it minimizes interaction between opposing counsel,
thus limiting the adverse effects on the process of bad blood between
lawyers or between a client on one side and a lawyer on the other.
When meeting outside the presence of the clients, the judge and
counsel can converse efficiently in vocabulary that a layperson would
not understand. If the client were present, counsel and the court would
feel the need to go more slowly and to explain terms of art, so as not
to alienate or be rude to the client. Thus, a judge who meets privately
with one lawyer at a time is likely to have better access to each party's
real view of the case and can move more efficiently through the various
subjects that need to be covered.
Another significant advantage of the format of meeting privately with
one lawyer at a time is that it permits a lawyer who is having client
control problems or who knows that his client is especially sensitive to
or concerned about certain matters to alert the judge to these difficulties
and, where appropriate, to enlist the judge's assistance. A lawyer is not
likely even to intimate that these kinds of problems exist in a meeting
that is attended by his client or by opposing counsel. Yet special client
sensibilities, or unreasonable recalcitrance by clients, can become major
obstacles to successful settlement negotiations. The results of the A.B.A.
survey indicate that most lawyers have difficulties with unreasonably
recalcitrant clients in a relatively small percentage of their cases (about
half of the responding litigators said they encountered this problem in
less than 10% of their cases). 43 But since only a small percentage of
all filed cases go all the way to trial, it is possible that unreasonable
clients account for a large percentage of the failures to reach settlement.
It is important to alert a judge who is dealing with a case in which
this kind of problem plays a part so that he can adjust his approach
to work more with the client, to attempt to gain his confidence, and to
be sure not to take steps that alienate him or leave him confused or
defensive. The results of the A.B.A. survey suggest that client control
problems are more likely to surface when the parties are natural persons
(as opposed to corporations or other institutional litigants) and when
the lawyers are younger and less experienced. 4 Judges who host settle-
ment conferences involving these kinds of litigants or lawyers might
give special consideration to using the private caucusing system.
43. W. BRAZIL. supra note 1, at 99.
44. Id. at 100.
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The private caucusing system also can offer the advantage of shielding
clients from the "bartering" tone that sometimes takes over the nego-
tiation process, especially in its later stages. Many clients accept the
horse-trading aspects of settlement negotiations, but some can be of-
fended when they see this kind of exchange taking place within the
judicial system.45 By meeting privately with one lawyer at a time, the
host of the conference reduces the risk that sensibilities will be offended
by a process that some clients may feel is appropriate only in used car
lots.
The lawyers are not the only participants who can be more frank
when the host of the conference uses the' private caucusing system. The
judge, too, can be more forthright. She can ask questions that she could
not ask in the presence of others. She can be more assertive in directing
the discussions and less concerned about preserving appearances. After
the judge has probed more vigorously and in areas she might shy away
from if clients or opposing counsel were present, she can articulate her
own analysis and express her own valuation more openly. This permits
the judge to use her time in the conference more efficiently and reduces
the likelihood that the lawyers will be forced to guess at what the judge
really thinks about the relative strengths of the parties' positions and
the relative reasonableness of the positions they are taking with respect
to settlement.
Another advantage of the private caucusing system, is that it reduces
the odds that one or more of the lawyers will be embarrassed in front
of his client by the judge's analysis or her questions or comments. This
kind of embarrassment can arise in several different ways. The judge
may offer a well-reasoned analysis, for example, that is both different
in result and obviously more compelling than the analysis that counsel
has developed for his client. Or the judge may make comments that
are inconsistent with what counsel earlier told his client about the case.
Similarly, the judge might ask important questions about the relevant
evidence or law that counsel cannot answer. Ifn addition, the judge might
ask why key documents were not brought to the conference or why key
materials that could have made the conference more productive were
not developed.
An example of such "lawyer-embarrassment" occurred in a conference
I hosted a year or so ago. In a meeting with a lawyer and his client,
I asked counsel to give me the figure for the present value of his client's
future damages. The lawyer had not converted the future figures to
present value and was unable to do so in response to my question, nor
had he explained the concept of present value to his client. When these
45. Author's personal experience.
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basic failures in preparation were exposed (inadvertently, on my part)
in front of his client, the lawyer was embarrassed and suffered a serious
loss of credibility with the person who was paying his bills.
These kinds of embarrassments in the presence of clients can damage
prospects for settlement in two ways. The first is obvious: a party is
less likely to agree to a settlement if his confidence in the advice he
is receiving from his lawyer has been shaken during the conference.
The second is less direct: embarrassed lawyers may become more de-
fensive or pugnacious in efforts to cover their errors or to recapture
their client's lost confidence. As an attorney becomes more defensive
or pugnacious, the likelihood that a settlement conference will be suc-
cessful plummets. Thus, one important advantage of private caucusing
with the lawyers lies in the fact that it reduces the odds that the judge's
questions or analyses will inspire counterproductive reactions in the
lawyers.
To summarize, private caucusing with one lawyer at a time (1) can
lead to more frank and open discussions, (2) can be less threatening to
counsel, (3) permits the participants to be more flexible, (4) can give
the judge access to sensitive information about parties that would
otherwise remain hidden, and (5) creates opportunities for more efficient,
less postured expositions of evidence and law. In private meetings, the
judge is likely to get closer to the parties' true feelings and positions
in less time than in any alternative format.
Private caucusing is not a panacea. It does not convert adversaries
into allies. It does not eliminate posturing and dishonesty. It does not
free the settlement process of the overlay of disingenuous ritual that
can try judicial patience and abort even the most conscientious efforts
to help parties find common ground. Judges who use this format will
find that lawyers continue to dissemble, exaggerate, and maneuver for
advantage. The promise of private caucusing is not to eliminate these
negative forces, but to reduce their sway.
Private caucusing can create problems for the settlement dynamic
that do not arise when a judge uses one of the traditional group formats
for the conference. The following section contains a discussion of these
potential problems.
B. Group Meetings: Counsel and Parties or Only Counsel
The one great advantage of conducting a settlement conference in
the group meeting format, with all counsel and all parties present, is
that this practice essentially eliminates the suspicion and anxiety that
can be inspired by secret meetings between the judge and one lawyer
or one side at a time. Some litigators are uncomfortable with a judge
using the private caucusing system in a settlement conference because
they fear that the judge and their opponents may strike secret deals or
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otherwise conspire to foist an unfair settlement on their client. These
litigators do not trust the judge to be even-handed; even though they,
too, would meet privately with the judge in this caucusing system.46 In
addition, some litigators do not want the settlement judge to know things
about the case that they do not know. 47 Some lawyers also believe that
it looks unseemly for a judge to hold secret meetings with one side to
an action.41 Concerned about appearances, these lawyers feel that secret
meetings with one side at'a time are inconsistent with their idea of the
role that should be played by the detached neutral judge in our system.49
To some extent, feelings of this kind are understandable when the
judge who hosts the settlement conference also is the judge who would
preside at trial if the case went that far. These concerns are quite
understandable in non-jury cases and in a system in which the settlement
judge subsequently shared with the trial judge the information he learned
and the feelings he developed during the settlement negotiations. But
if the judge who hosts the conference will have no other contact with
the case, and if he will preserve the confidentiality of what he learns
during the negotiations, it is difficult to understand why his meeting
privately with one side or lawyer at a time is objectionable or unseemly.
An objection based on the fact that the conferences are not open to
the public and are not on the record would apply equally to every kind
of settlement conference, even those in which the judge meets simul-
taneously with all counsel and parties. Such a broad objection to the
fact of confidentiality flies in the face of the public policy that is
reflected in Federal Rule of Evidence 408 (and its state law analogues),
which encourages private, voluntary efforts to settle disputes by pro-
hibiting parties from introducing settlement communications at trial for
the purpose of proving liability or the amount of damages.5 0
46. Learned while conducting interviews for ABA survey: Litigator's Views about
Appropriate Roles and Effective Techniques for Federal Judges (1985).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Federal Rule of Evidence 408:
Compromise and Offers to compromise
Evidence of (1) furnishing or offering or promising to furnish, or (2) accepting
or offering or promising to accept, a valuable consideration in compromising or
attempting to compromise a claim which was disputed as to either validity or
amount, is not admissible to prove liability for or invalidity of the claim or its
amount. Evidence of conduct or statements made in compromise negotiations is
likewise not admissible. This rule does not require the exclusion of any evidence
otherwise discoverable merely because it is presented in the course of compromise
negotiations. This rule also does not require exclusion when the evidence is offered
for another purpose, such as proving bias or prejudice of a witness, negativing
a contention of undue delay, or proving an effort to obstruct a criminal investigation
or prosecution.
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Objections based on fear of judicial corruption seem wholly unfounded.
There is no empirical evidence that would support the fear that judges
in such settings abuse their knowledge or status by conspiring with one
side to take advantage of the other. To engage in such practices would
do great violence to a judge's oath of office and to his professional
identity. There would have to be a compelling incentive to induce anyone
to inflict this kind of damage on himself, and it is difficult to imagine
what this incentive might be for a settlement judge. It is important to
bear in mind that in a settlement conference a judge has no formal
power. He cannot force anyone to accept anything. He is useful only
to the extent that he is persuasive, and he is persuasive only to the
extent that he retains personal credibility and to the extent that his
views are well-reasoned. Because a settlement judge does not have the
power to compel any particular result, and because both parties must
voluntarily accept the terms of any agreement that might emerge from
a conference, there is virtually no incentive for corruption. There certainly
is less incentive for corruption in this setting than there is at trial or
on appeal, when judges have real, formal power. Yet there is almost
never corruption even in these more tempting situations. Thus it is hard
to take seriously an imagined fear that corruption could enter the
settlement conference arena.
FED. R. EVID. 408.
Florida Rule of Evidence §90.408:
Compromise and offers to compromise
Evidence of an offer to compromise a claim which was disputed as to validity
or amount, as well as any relevant conduct or statements made in negotiations
concerning a compromise, is inadmissible to prove liability or absence of liability
for the claim or its value.
FLA. R. EvID. §90.408.
California Evidence Code:
§1152.5. Mediation
(a) Subject to the conditions and exceptions provided in this section, when
persons agree to conduct and participate in a mediation for the purpose of
compromising, settling, or resolving a dispute:
(1) Evidence of anything said or of any admission made in the course of the
mediation is not admissible in evidence, and disclosure of any such evidence shall
not be compelled, in any civil action in which, pursuant to law, testimony can
be compelled to be given.
(2) Unless the document otherwise provides, no document prepared for the
purpose of, or in the course of, or pursuant to, the mediation, or copy thereof,
is admissible in evidence, and disclosure of any such document shall not be
compelled, in any civil action in which, pursuant to law, testimony can be compelled
to be given.
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A different and more signficant source of resistance to private cau-
cusing might be fear that a lawyer will communicate false or misleading
information to the judge during a confidential session and that the judge
will rely on that information in forming recommendations about terms
of settlement. Some lawyers might fear that private caucusing destroys
the system of intellectual and ethical checks and balances that inheres
in the adversary system. These lawyers might perceive a danger that a
settlement judge might unknowingly abuse his power of persuasion by
advocating terms of settlement that he feels are reasonable only because
he has accepted certain false information that he was given in a private
session in which opposing counsel had no opportunity to challenge and
correct the information. Judges should acknowledge that there is some
basis for this fear and should take steps to ensure that their reasoning
is not compromised by false information. The best protection against
this danger is for the judge to spell out, to each lawyer, the full basis
for the reasoning that supports any recommendation he makes.
(b) Subdivision (a) does not limit the admissibility of evidence if all persons
who conducted or otherwise participated in the mediation consent to its disclosure.
(c) This section does not apply unless, before the mediation begins, the persons
who agree to conduct and participate in the mediation execute an agreement in
writing that sets out the text of subdivisions (a) and (b) and states that the
persons agree that this section shall apply to the mediation.
(d) This section does not apply where the admissibility of the evidence is
governed by Section 4351.5 or 4607 of the Civil Code or by Section 1747 of
the Code of Civil Procedure.
(e) Nothing in this section makes admissible evidence that is inadmissible
under Section 1152 or any other statutory provision, including, but not limited
to, the sections listed in subdivision (d). Nothing in this section limits the
confidentiality provided pursuant to Section 65 of the Labor Code.
(f) Paragraph (2) of subdivision (a) does not limit either of the following:
(1) The admissibility of the agreement referred to in subdivision (c).
(2) The effect of an agreement not to take a default in a case pending
civil action.
(Added by Stats. 1985, c. 731, p.-, §1.)
CALIF. EVID. CODE §1152.5 (West 1985).
Minnesota Rule of Evidence 408:
RULE 408. COMPROMISE AND OFFERS TO COMPROMISE
Evidence of (I) furnishing or offering or promising to furnish, or (2) accepting or
offering or promising to accept, a valuable consideration in compromising or attempting
to compromise a claim which was disputed as to either validity or amount, is not
admissible to prove liability for or invalidity of the claim or its amount. Evidence of
conduct or statements made in compromise negotiations is likewise not admissible.
This rule does not require the exclusion of any evidence otherwise discoverable merely
because it is presented in the course of compromise negotiations. This rule also does
not require exclusion when the evidence is offered for another purpose, such as proving
bias or prejudice of a witness, negativing a contention of undue delay, or proving an
effort to obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution.
MINN. R. EvID. 408.
22
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Another source of discomfort with private caucusing may simply be
that in some parts of the country settlement work has not been done
this way by judges in the past. In some locales, private caucusing is
out of sync with traditional mores. So it is greeted with suspicion and
resisted.
If the source of the discomfort with private caucusing is unfamiliarity,
a judge might be able to gain the participants' confidence in the process
by explaining its rationale and by emphasizing that it has been extensively
and successfully used in other parts of the country. But if the source
of the discomfort is deeper than unfamiliarity, or if explanations and
reassurances fail to overcome suspicions, the settlement judge might be
well advised to opt for a procedure that is familiar and that will not
inspire emotional reactions that could interfere with negotiations. Need-
less to say, settlement judges must work with the people and the situations
as they present themselves at the time of any given conference. If one
or more of the lawyers or parties is deeply apprehensive at the prospect
of the settlement judge holding private conversations with one attorney
or side at a time, an attempt to force that format might well backfire.
In such circumstances, the judge may be able to contribute to the
settlement dynamic only if he meets with everyone in a group setting.
Unfortunately, the group format has significant limitations and calls
for a special level of diplomacy by the judicial host. In private caucusing,
the settlement judge can be more frank; he need not worry about
embarrassing a lawyer or litigant in front of the others. He also need
not worry about how each lawyer's analysis of the case or articulation
of his client's position will affect other lawyers or parties. In the group
format, however, there is a real risk that the participants will offend
each other or that assertiveness by one will make the other defensive,
thus encouraging each participant to take a more extreme position and
Ohio Rule of Evidence 408:
Evid R 408
Compromise and offers to compromise
Evidence of (1) furnishing or offering or promising to furnish, or (2) accepting or
offering or promising to accept, a valuable consideration in compromising or attempting
to compromise a claim which was disputed as to either validity or amount, is not
admissible to prove liability for or invalidity of the claim or its amount. Evidence of
conduct or statements made in compromise negotiations is likewise not admissible.
This rule does not require the exclusion of any evidence otherwise discoverable merely
because it is presented in the course of compromise negotiations. This rule also does
not require exclusion when the evidence is offered for another purpose, such as proving
bias or prejudice of a witness, negativing a contention of undue delay, or proving an
effort to obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution.
OHio R. EvID. 408 (Adopted eff. 7-1-80).
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damaging the chances of ultimately reaching an agreement.
In one group session (attended by lawyers and clients) that I hosted
some time ago, one side managed to thoroughly insult the other by
presenting an analysis of the case and a settlement proposal that was
patently unreasonable. The conference was worse than a complete waste
of time; it drove the parties even farther apart. If the judge has no
opportunity to meet privately with each side before the group meeting,
he will have no opportunity to assess the reasonableness of each litigant's
position and no capacity to move them closer to common ground before
they confront each other. And after a party has taken a position in
front of the others in a group setting, it can be much more difficult
to persuade him to make a change. Parties and lawyers often will have
invested too much "face" in the stance they have publicly taken to be
prepared to "retreat" to a compromise position.
To reduce the likelihood that the participants will paint themselves
into corners from which they may feel they cannot escape without an
intolerable loss of face, the host of the group session often will be
tempted to discourage participants from offering specific analyses and
proposals. Instead, the host will try to facilitate the settlement dynamic
by keeping the discussion at a general level and encouraging counsel
to communicate their client's views through oblique signals rather than
through straightforward expositions or proposals. Thus the group meeting
format can lead either to studied circuitry or to intensified posturing
and exaggeration. Neither circuitry nor posturing promotes the kind of
careful, detailed, straightforward analysis that is essential to rational
searches for fair terms of settlement. Thus the group meeting is likely
to be successful only if the parties come to the conference with similar
views about the value of the case and do not provoke each other during
the course of the discussion to adopt more extreme positions.
The risk that counsel will dissemble or exaggerate because of the
presence of the opposition tends to undermine what might otherwise be
a significant advantage of the group meeting format. In the group
setting, each party hears directly what the. other parties have to say.
Thus each party has direct access to the other parties' analyses and to
the proposals they make for settling the case. Misleading or erroneous
statements made by one side can be challenged and corrected by the
other. Moreover, there is no risk that important points will be lost or
misunderstood because of errors or omissions by the judge as he shuttles
from side to side. This format also eliminates the risk that a lawyer
will not communicate an offer or demand to his client, or will unin-
tentionally distort it when he transmits it. In some settings, these
advantages can be significant. For example, if the settlement judge
believes that one or more of the lawyers does not understand the case
well and is not likely to communicate accurately the opposition's analysis
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or proposals, the group meeting creates an opportunity for the lawyer
on one side to speak directly to the client on the other side.
I must add, however, that in a conference I hosted not long ago one
of the lawyers perceived this as a purpose of the group meeting and
deeply resented it. He became very angry, accusing the court of using
the format of the settlement conference to interfere with his relationship
with his client. The intensity of his reaction intimidated his client and
doomed the negotiations. It may well be the case, however, that the
lawyer reacted this way because he considered the group meeting to
be a deviation from the norm of private caucusing, which has become
the standard format of settlement conferences in our region. Moreover,
we used the group meeting after a series of private caucuses had failed
to move the parties closer together and at the suggestion of a lawyer
who felt that his messages were not being delivered to the client on
the other side. At the group meeting, only one side made a substantial
presentation; the opposition played the role of the audience, not being
prepared to make a comparable counterpresentation. Thus there was
considerable imbalance in the process. All of these factors probably
contributed to the intensely hostile reaction of the lawyer who represented
the client at whom the presentation during the group meeting was aimed.
It must be emphasized that the value of structuring the conference
so that the two sides can communicate directly with one another depends
in large measure on the quality of what will be communicated. If parties
(really lawyers) are likely to intensify their posturing and their exag-
geration when they communicate directly and in the presence of clients,
the value of direct communication is compromised because what is being
directly communicated is not what anyone really thinks. Moreover,
proposals the parties would in fact accept, or at least seriously consider,
are never made because each side is preoccupied with not appearing
"soft" to the other. Thus the group format actually can make it more
difficult for the parties to learn one another's true positions.
On the other hand, the group meeting offers one advantage that can
be consequential to litigants or lawyers who are especially distrustful
of others or who lack confidence in their own analysis of the case. In
the group setting, every participant knows every piece of information
that gets to the settlement judge and that affects his recommendations
or valuations. Some people feel better equipped to assess the value of
recommendations from their judicial host when they know all the in-
formation on which he bases these recommendations. This knowledge
also may increase some litigants' confidence in the impartiality of the
settlement judge. These psychological effects of an "open" process could
be significant in some settings, such as when one or more of the litigants
is new to the adjudicatory system and is especially fearful that someone
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will take advantage of him. For some parties, an open process may be
the only kind that can instill the confidence that is essential to reaching
a compromise agreement.
Unfortunately, the "openness" of the process is often illusory. Parties
who participate in an "open" exchange probably feel more pressure to
perform in front of the opposition and to leave themselves room to
maneuver; as a result, they are likely to put extra distance between
what they say and what they really think. Thus, while it is true that
in an open session everyone knows what all the cards in the judge's
hand are, those cards may have little to do with the realities of the
case or with the positions the parties ultimately would take on the
settlement questions. In short, the openness of the system seriously
compromises the quality of the information that reaches the judge.
By compromising the quality of what the judge knows, the process
compromises the value and reliability of his opinions. Experienced set-
tlement judges will know that what they are being told in this kind of
setting most likely represents only the tip of the informational iceberg.
Conscientious judges may respond to this ignorance by playing passive
roles or by offering only the most general, abstract reactions to the
case. Thus their inputs will not be analytically penetrating and will not
be especially useful. This fact may not be of great consequence in small
and simple cases, in which there is little room for reasonable minds to
disagree about values and in which the judicial role is simply to provide
a forum for exchanges by the lawyers. But in more complex matters
the quality of the settlement judge's contributions depends on the quality
of the information the lawyers share with the judge. The litigators who
responded to the A.B.A. survey made it very clear that what they want
most from a settlement judge is the expression of an informed, analytical
opinion.5' These litigators feel that it is through such opinions that
judges can contribute most to the settlement dynamic. Given this fact,
judges should opt for the settlement conference format that maximizes
the quality of the information they receive and thereby maximizes the
reliability of the opinions they form. In most situations, that format is
private caucusing, not open meetings.
Some of the most intense pressures that attend the open meeting
format can be reduced by limiting participation to lawyers. Unfortu-
nately, excluding clients does not alter the fact that contributes most
to the posturing and to the distortion of the flow of information: the
presence of the adversary. The quality of what is communicated to the
settlement judge remains seriously compromised (except in the simplest
of cases) as long as the opposing sides make presentations in front of
51. W. BRAZIL, supra note 1, at 2.
[Vol. 3:1 1987]
HOSTING SETTLEMENT CONFERENCES
one another. Thus, the use of at least some private caucusing in all
cases of any subtlety is advisable.
In the group session format, there is a greater risk that information
about the parties' true positions on terms of settlement will be distorted
than information about the evidence on the merits of the case. This is
because in most cases each lawyer is in a much better position to attack
and counterbalance what the other lawyers say about the evidence than
what they say about the terms of settlement that their clients might
be willing to consider. Thus judges might consider use of the group
meeting format to discuss the evidence, then turn to private caucusing
to explore the terms on which parties might agree to settle. Unfortunately,
in such a "bifurcated" approach lawyers may make each other angry
in the group session by the ways they argue the evidence, or may take
positions about what the evidence is, or what it signifies, that make it
very difficult to be flexible when they discuss possible terms of settlement
in private with the judge.
C. One Version of a Hybrid Structure: The Judge-Led Group Session
Followed By Private Caucusing
Two highly regarded settlement judges in northern California, the
recently retired Francis Mayer of the Superior Court of the City and
County of San Francisco, and the late Magistrate Richard Goldsmith
of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Cali-
fornia, developed a format for settlement conferences that incorporates
both a group session and private caucusing.52 Since both of these judges
worked under the master calander system, they would not preside at
trial if their settlement efforts did not result in an agreement. 3 That
fact gives the settlement judge more freedom to become intensely
involved in negotiations than he would feel if he were expected to preside
at a trial in the event the case did not settle.
Judges Mayer and Goldsmith typically open their settlement confer-
ences by hosting a group session attended by all counsel, but not by
the parties.5 4 At this session the judge does not ask the lawyers to make
presentations and does not solicit their analyses or ask them to describe
their client's positions on settlement.5 Instead, the judge himself opens
the meeting by describing, in narrative form, his understanding of the
facts of the case. 6 To prepare this presentation, the judge draws on
52. The author has spoken with attorneys who have appeared before Judge Mayer
and judicial colleagues. The author has spoken with Magistrate Goldsmith about his
conference techniques and has attended seminars taught by Magistrate Goldsmith.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
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materials available in the file and on the written settlement conference
statements the parties have submitted.17 At the close of his presentation,
he permits counsel to offer specific corrections, but he does not permit
extended debate about contested issues and does not invite the lawyers
to respond with their own versions of what happened. 3 To make sure
the conference is well focused analytically, and that subsequent nego-
tiations are not compromised by serious misunderstandings, he might
list the key issues that the parties dispute and the significant matters
on which they agree. This procedure can increase the efficiency of. the
subsequent private discussions between the judge and counsel.
After completing his narrative of the facts, and noting corrections
suggested by counsel, the judge shifts formats and begins a series of
private meetings with one lawyer at a time. 9 In these confidential
sessions, he explores the strength of the evidence and law that supports
each litigant's position and points out weaknesses or problems that might
justify movement toward common ground. 60
This hybrid format has several advantages. Lawyers who have had
conferences with Judges Mayer and Goldsmith report that their factual
narratives establish their credibility at the outset.61 These narratives
demonstrate that the judge is taking the settlement conference seriously,
that he is well prepared and has a formidable grasp of the case, and
that he is no intellectual slouch. By leading off with his own narrative
account of the facts, the judge is able to occupy the pivotal factual
ground at the outset, leaving counsel with little room to try to manipulate
his perception of the basic predicates of the suit. By stating the facts
himself, instead of asking each side to present its version, the judge
dramatically reduces the opportunities counsel otherwise would have to
exaggerate, posture, puff, and antagonize one another. He also avoids
the lengthy excursions into only marginally relevant material that ac-
company many lawyers' presentations. His narratives focus the lawyers'
attention on the central aspects of the case and give him a chance to
identify the parts of the case he considers most important and thus
most worthy of detailed attention during the private caucuses. Moreover,
the opportunity he gives the lawyers in the group session to correct
mistakes in his factual narrative serves as an excellent vehicle for
identifying the significant factual matters that are in dispute.6 2 Drawing
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Magistrate Claudia Wilken of the United States District Court for the Northern
District of California, who uses the procedure described in the text, reports having had
this experience in several cases.
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on the written settlement conference statements submitted by the lawyers
prior to the conference, the judge occasionally exposes areas of disa-
greement that counsel had not yet identified. Thus the opening session
equips both counsel and the court to move expeditiously to the center
of things in the private caucuses.
By exposing his perception of the facts to all counsel at the outset,
the judge also reduces fears that he might predicate his ultimate
settlement valuation on a misperception of some important aspect of
the case. Knowing what assumptions the judge is making about the key
facts of the case, the lawyers will be less worried that the judge's
recommendations about settlement have been contaminated as a result
of someone's selling him, during one of the private caucuses, a self-
serving and very questionable version of a key fact. Thus the opening
group session can dispel some of the apprehensions counsel might
otherwise feel about the consequences of what goes on behind the closed
doors of the one-on-one meetings.
There is much to commend the approach developed by Judges Mayer
and Goldsmith. It seems to offer the best of both settlement conference
worlds: the reassurance of the open session and the relative candor,
flexibility and efficiency of private caucusing. Unfortunately, there also
are significant disadvantages to this settlement conference format. From
the perspective of the judge who will host the conference, the most
obvious drawback is the amount of preparation required to develop a
credible narrative in all but the simplest of cases. Many judges who
are called upon to host settlement conferences simply do not have the
time to master the file and the parties' preconference submissions to
the degree that would be required to prepare a solid narrative of the
facts in the action. A weak, thin, equivocal, or inaccurate narrative by
the judge at the outset of the conference would jeopardize his credibility
and thus his effectiveness as a facilitator.
Unless presented with great sensitivity, an opening narrative also risks
creating the impression in the lawyers' minds that the judge has pre-
maturely formed opinions about key issues or has taken sides before
permitting each litigant to present its position in some detail. A judge
who gives counsel the impression that he is closed-minded, too quick
on the analytical trigger or biased in favor of one party is likely to be
virtually useless in settlement negotiations.
Judicial hosts of settlement conferences also must be wary of rein-
forcing some lawyers' feelings that judges are much more interested in
getting cases off their dockets than in being sure that the terms of
settlements are fair. A judge who presents a factual narrative superfi-
cially, with apparent disdain for details or subtlety, or in a manner that
seems calculated to gloss over or power through disputes on potentially
significant issues, encourages counsel to infer either that he is an
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intellectual lightweight whose opinions are valueless or that he is so
preoccupied with pressing for a settlement that he cannot be trusted to
offer reliable recommendations.
There is another, somewhat more subtle difficulty with the approach
that calls for the judge to open with a factual narrative. In all but the
simplest of cases, even a judge who prepares conscientiously for a
settlement conference is not going to know as much about the underlying
facts and circumstances as the lawyers who have lived with the dispute
through pretrial motions, investigations, and discovery. A judge who
"takes charge" of the factual setting by presenting his own narrative
account at the outset leaves himself less room to learn from the parties.
I have learned, painfully, that it is easy to overestimate one's under-
standing of the situation, even in those cases when I have devoted
considerable time to preparing for the conference. Moreover, the judge's
preconference understanding of the evidence can be no better than the
lawyers' preconference understanding of it. Yet I have found that the
lawyers' understanding often deepens or changes during, and because
of, their interaction with each other and with the judge in the settlement
conference. Questions posed by the judge, or perspectives offered by
an opponent, often lead attorneys to point to evidence or information
they had not focused on before. Thus the settlement negotiations take
on a dialectical quality, and it is through this dialectic that the lawyers'
and the judge's analyses of the case mature and become more reliable.
A judge who begins a settlement conference with an assertive factual
narrative risks cutting off the dialectical process prematurely, and thus
risks deceiving himself into thinking he understands the case when in
fact he does not.
The format for settlement conferencing described in the next section
reduces some of the risks just described.
VIII. A DETAILED ROADMAP FOR CONDUCTING A SETTLEMENT
CONFERENCE USING THE PRIVATE CAUCUSING FORMAT
This section describes with considerable specificity one way to struc-
ture and conduct a settlement conference. The methods described in
this section are not always appropriate or superior to others. Individual
judges must fashion approaches that suit their own personalities and
styles. I hope, however, that even judges who prefer a quite different
format and approach will find some of the ideas in this section useful.
In thinking about what takes place during a settlement conference
it is helpful to divide the process into four conceptual dimensions:
1. tone and style (set initially through an introductory "speech");
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2. presentations by the lawyers;
3. analysis (a dialectical process between judge and counsel and,
through the judge, between counsel);
4. negotiations.
In the real world, these dimensions overlap and are interrelated.
A. Tone and Style
1. Location of the Conference. Most of the serious negotiations in a
judicially hosted settlement conference should take place in chambers.
My pattern is to open the conferences with brief introductions of people
and procedures at a group meeting attended by all in my courtroom.
Then, when I meet privately with one lawyer or one side at a time, I
take the person(s) involved into my chambers. I do not like to make
the people who are not talking to me wait in the corridor; lawyers seem
to become comfortable with corridors, but making clients wait there is
impolite and invites disrespect for the settlement process itself. I invite
everyone to wait in my courtroom, where they can talk among themselves
or review materials related to the conference.
There are several advantages of structuring the conference so that
the participants are at various times in the courtroom and in chambers.
Assembling as a group in the courtroom at the outset forcefully reminds
everyone where they will be if they do not settle the case. The formality
of the courtroom also encourages people to take the conference seriously
and to behave respectfully. In contrast, conducting the private substantive
discussions in chambers encourages a sense of intimacy and informality
that may make the participants more open with you during discussions
and more flexible during negotiations. It is by no means true, of course,
that meeting privately in chambers eliminates all posturing and converts
all lawyers and parties into paragons of virtue and reason. But being
in chambers tends to create a more relaxed atmosphere and makes some
people feel that they have been admitted to the inner sanctum. This
atmosphere and these feelings can help reduce the defensiveness, com-
bativeness, and rigidity that litigation fosters and that interfere with
efforts to reach a settlement.
At the close of the conference, I reassemble all participants in the
courtroom, either to confirm in court, and on the record, that an
agreement has been reached; or to report, at least at a general level,
the status of the negotiations, to plan next steps, and to thank everyone
for the work they committed to the process. Because some attorneys
fear that they might have offended the judge if they did not reach a
settlement, or if they disagreed with the judge's valuation of the case,
it is a good idea for the judicial host, at the close of the conference,
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to thank everyone for their efforts and to reassure them that he un-
derstands that reasonable people can disagree about these kinds of cases
and that no one should feel that the host of the conference bears them
any ill will or would hold anything against them in any proceedings
down the road.63
2. Introductions. Just before the conference is scheduled to begin,
the judicial host should review the settlement conference statements the
parties have submitted, any notes she has made from them, and any
other material she or her law clerk has developed in preparing for the
event. The judge, as the host of the conference, needs to know the
names of the lawyers and of the people who will represent the parties
during the negotiations. The judge should assemble the lawyers and
parties in one room and begin the conference by making introductions
and by explaining the procedure that will be used. Upon entering the
room, the judge should shake hands with each lawyer and party, ad-
dressing each by name. The seemingly inconsequential act of addressing
the participants by name can be very helpful. It signals to everyone
that the judge has prepared well and helps set an appropriate tone,
suggesting that the judge does not want the conference to be dominated
by the remoteness and formality that is often associated with interactions
with a judge in open court.
When introducing himself, the judge should make sure that all the
lawyers and parties have been introduced to one another. This is another
small step that can help encourage a sense of respect and connection
between people. It also helps, albeit modestly, to break down some of
the fears, hostilities and rigidities that people in litigation experience,
especially when they are in the courthouse.
After the personal introductions, the judge should describe and explain
the format of the conference and the role he will play in it. This brief
statement about the procedure is extremely important. Lawyers from
other jurisdictions may not be accustomed to the private caucusing
method and may be taken aback by it unless it is explained. The risk
of alienating clients is even greater. A judge cannot safely assume that
the lawyers will have explained to their clients how he structures his
conferences, and why. Since few lay people expect judges to hold secret
meetings with one lawyer at a time, and since the clients will be excluded
from these meetings at least for the first round of discussions, it is
imperative that the judge explain how the process will work and apologize
for not including clients at all stages.
These initial explanations of the procedure are important to clients.
On more than one occasion I have either failed to explain the process,
63. Attributable to Aaron Pothurst, Esq., of Miami, Florida.
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or have offered only the most cursory statement, then have proceeded
to thoroughly alienate the clients by moving in and out of private
meetings with lawyers for hours, essentially ignoring the people whose
case it is. In one conference, the client, a senior executive with a local
corporation, interrupted my self absorbed shuttle diplomacy by an-
nouncing that since it was obvious that he was not needed, he could
not understand why the court had ordered him to be present and that
he was leaving. After I scurried to mend the courtesy fences, he
reluctantly agreed to stay, but he remained openly resentful and ag-
gressively wrested away from his lawyer control over the remainder of
the negotiations. In fact, his lawyer sat moot for the rest of the session,
with his eyes fixed on the floor.
In another case, a client who had been left for a couple of hours to
watch counsel and me move in and out of closed sessions vented his
sense of frustration and powerlessness at the closing group meeting by
making a long, emotional, and internally contradictory statement, ob-
viously acting well beyond his lawyer's control and not helping his cause.
Judges who host settlement conferences have a duty to try to reduce
the feelings that provoke this kind of acting out. One method is to
interrupt protracted periods of private caucusing with short group sessions
in which the judge reports on the status of the discussions at a general
level to the clients, and reassures them that this apparently strange
procedure is designed to maximize the likelihood that a fair resolution
of the dispute can be reached.
A few words are in order here about the content of my introductory
remarks. They need not be lengthy. I usually open by describing the
private caucusing system that I normally use. After explaining its
rationale, I ask the group as a whole whether there is some other
procedure that would be better suited to the situation or the case in
question. Occasionally a lawyer will suggest that all counsel participate
in the first substantive discussion, or that he be permitted to bring his
client to the first private caucus, but in the vast majority of cases
everyone is content to use the suggested procedure.
In my introductory remarks, I explain that I have conducted a great
many settlement conferences and have found that they tend to be more
productive if, at least in the beginning, I meet with one lawyer at a
time. I go on to explain that I have found that counsel tend to posture
somewhat less when they meet with me in private, and that for that
reason we can cover ground more quickly and can learn more about
each side's view of the case and its settlement position when we proceed
with these private meetings. Also, if the clients were present it would
be rude not to explain the technical vocabulary and legal concepts used,
but doing so would extend considerably the time the process would
take.
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I point out that the purpose of the initial sessions with the lawyers
is to get a sense of how each side views the case and of what the
settlement possibilities might be. I then reassure the clients that their
lawyers will keep them fully apprised of what transpires in the meetings
with me and that it is the clients, not the lawyers or the judge, who
hold the decision-making power in the settlement negotiations. Finally,
I observe that we will hold a brief meeting as a group at the close of
the conference so that I can report, at least in general terms, on the
status of the negotiations. As a matter of courtesy, it is a good practice
to ask if anyone has any questions about how the conference will proceed
before launching the first round of one-on-one sessions. It is also a good
idea to tell the parties that they can ask the judge questions during
the transitions between private caucus sessions if, after consulting with
their lawyer, they are concerned about some aspect of the procedure.
Simply making the clients feel invited to share their concerns can reduce
the alienation this process might otherwise engender.
It is also important for the judge to outline the basic ground rules
about confidentiality in his opening remarks. He should point out that
litigants cannot try to prove liability or damages at trial by introducing
evidence of offers or statements made during settlement negotiations.
He should also point out that the private caucus format virtually
eliminates the possibility that a party might have access to and then
later somehow attempt to use any statements made by its opponent
during the settlement negotiations. The judge wants to make it very
clear, especially to the clients, that he will not disclose any information
that he learns in confidence from any lawyer or party unless that lawyer
or party first gives explicit permission to share the information with
others. These explicit reassurances show that the judge is self-aware in
this sensitive area and thus is not likely to inadvertently violate confidences.
Opening remarks can be used to set a constructive tone for the
conference. That tone has two principal dimensions: one is relaxed and
informal, the other is upbeat and optimistic. The judge may encourage
a relaxed atmosphere by not wearing judicial robes and by being friendly,
informal, and open. The judge may go to meet the participants rather
than having them come to meet him. He may ask them to remain
seated when he enters the courtroom where they have gathered, then
go into the gallery area to shake their hands and talk to them about
the procedures he will use. Obviously the goal is to create as much
distance as possible between the feeling at the settlement conference
and the formalism, pugilism, and defensiveness normally associated with
a trial.
It is neither effective nor appropriate for a judge to create an
atmosphere that threatens or intimidates the participants. I explicitly
reassure the participants in the conference, in my opening remarks, that
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I think it is unfair and unprofessional to use my position to try to
pressure lawyers or litigants into accepting either my views or any
particular terms of settlement. I state clearly, at the outset, that I will
have no power over the ultimate disposition of the case if it goes to
trial and that I will make no effort during the conference to pressure
anyone to accept any given proposal or line of reasoning. To reinforce
this message, and to make clear my perception of my function in this
process, I explain that my role is to help refine the analysis of the case,
to offer reactions to evidence and lines of argument, to help form more
reliable predictions about what might happen at trial, and to facilitate
communication between the parties about possible grounds for settlement.
I emphasize that I am here to offer the parties whatever help I can,
not to try to force anything on them. The participants should be
encouraged to view the judge as a resource and a tool, and to use him
in any way- that might be productive. To reinforce these messages, I
emphasize that the ultimate purpose of the conference is to reason
together toward a common prediction of what is most likely to happen
at trial, then to use that reasoning and prediction to see if common
ground can be found. The core of the process is reasoning, and cases
that fail to settle represent failures of communication and reason.
Creating an upbeat, optimistic tone is somewhat more difficult. The
challenge is to be positive about prospects without appearing to be
naive. It does no good to gloss blithely over huge obstacles to reaching
an agreement. On the other hand, it makes little sense to emphasize,
in opening remarks, how far apart the parties appear to be and how
insurmountable the barriers to progress seem. A judge disserves his role
in this process if he fails to bring to it his own sense of energy and
momentum. To have an energizing effect, a judge must appear to be
solidly in touch with the realities of the situation and yet remain
optimistic that the parties have a real shot at making the conference
productive. The judge should encourage the participants to appreciate
that a judicially hosted settlement conference presents a special oppor-
tunity. It brings everyone together on obviously neutral territory and
compels them to analyze the case and their options systematically and
in context, using the judge for feedback and perspective. Thus the
conference is a uniquely propitious setting for searching for solutions.
To communicate an appropriate sense of realism and energy, and to
encourage the participants to view the conference as a special oppor-
tunity, I might conclude my opening remarks by saying: "I have studied
your submissions and have done some related homework. As you ap-
preciate, you come here separated by some substantial differences of
opinion about where this case might go. This is the kind of case,
however, that ought to be settleable. I have helped parties settle others
like it. There is a lot of pressure on my schedule, so I assure you that
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I would not be here with you if I felt this was likely to be a waste of
time. Despite your differences, I think we have a real shot at making
progress today. I am prepared to commit a lot of energy to this goal.
I hope each of you will reciprocate. I also hope that each of you will
use me and the opportunity a conference like this presents to get
feedback, to learn through exchanges of views, and to round out your
perspective on the case. Let's get started. I will meet first in chambers
with Mr. Jones, counsel for plaintiff."
Most settlement conferences I host can be divided into three over-
lapping stages. In the first, the parties present the essence of their views
of the case to the judge (in private caucus sessions), with the judge
editing very little, playing for the most part the role of a student. In
the second stage, the emphasis is on analysis, with the judge playing a
substantially more assertive role, probing evidence and legal theories,
trying to educate himself and the parties about the strengths and
weaknesses of their respective positions. The third stage consists of the
negotiations themselves, with the judge helping parties exchange offers
and demands and develop alternative components of possible agreements.
The paragraphs that follow track this conceptual division.
B. Presentations by the Lawyers: The Initial Private Sessions with One
Attorney at a Time
There are several important points for the judge to keep in mind as
he launches the first round of private meetings with counsel. The first
is that he should keep approximately equal the amount of time he
spends with each side and he should not make the first session or round
of sessions too long. There is a danger inherent in the structure of the
conference that the judge will spend a disproportionate period with the
first lawyer he takes into chambers. There is more to learn from the
first lawyer simply because he is first. The long period behind closed
doors with one side can undermine the other side's confidence in the
judge's neutrality and can spawn fears that he is being sold a bill of
goods by lawyer number one.6 4 So, the judge should learn as much
about the case as possible before the conference begins, then exercise
discipline in the first round of caucuses so that he spends equal time
with each lawyer, spreading his learning over several sessions if necessary.
If the lawyers' written settlement conference statements are thorough
these initial sessions need not be lengthy. However, I often find that
the statements filed in advance of the conference are too superficial to
support the quality of analysis needed to make the negotiations productive.
It is important for the judge to begin the private caucus sessions by
64. Author's personal experience.
[Vol. 3:1 1987]
HOSTING SETTLEMENT CONFERENCES
permitting each side to tell its story in a non-judgmental environment.
There are two key points here. The first is to let each lawyer talk; the
second is to suspend, temporarily, the instinct to aggressively ask ques-
tions and to force counsel to move efficiently through an analytical
framework that the judge has predetermined. The judge should move
into an analytically more penetrating mode only gradually, after the
first round, and when making that transition he should do it through
questions rather than through pronouncements of judgment. In the
beginning, it is important that the judge not assume that he knows the
case and the parties' postures so well that he can shape the discussion.
Instead, he should open the first private session with each lawyer by
asking her to describe, briefly, the essential aspects of the case from
her client's perspective. The judge should permit counsel to meander a
bit in these first contacts, because what he perceives initially as a
digression may turn out to be of considerable consequence, either to
the merits of the case or to a party's position on settlement.
Moreover, by letting the lawyers talk the judge gives them an op-
portunity to drift into disclosures or concessions that he never would
have anticipated. In short, it is important in these first sessions not to
act like a judge sitting on the bench in open court. The judge cannot
succumb to the temptation, at the outset, to assert control over the
analysis or over other aspects of the process. This entails resisting the
temptation to engage in intellectual sparring, to show off analytical
acumen or knowledge of the relevant subject area, or to make evaluative
comments about or to criticize counsel's narratives or statements. In
the beginning, the judge's job is to listen and to absorb, not to direct.
There will be time enough to take charge intellectually, should doing
so turn out to be appropriate.
By letting the lawyers do most of the talking at the outset, the judge
also reinforces an important message: that he is open minded, that he
wants to learn from them, that he has not come to the conference with
predetermined ideas and preset objectives. This appearance of openness
will enhance the credibility of the evaluative comments the judge offers
later in conference. Moreover, the judge's initial assessments of the
parties' stories or positions can turn out to be wrong.
I recently hosted a settlement conference in a case that a manufacturer
filed as a simple collection action, seeking recovery of about $15,000
for goods sold and delivered to a retailer. The defendant had filed a
counterclaim, but in the initial sessions I viewed it as simply a move
for leverage and did not take it seriously. My instinct was to urge the
defendant to offer most of the money it apparently owed the manufac-
turer, as the amount involved was too small to support extensive discovery
and a substantial trial. But the defendant balked, insisting that its
counterclaim was real and that defects in the plaintiff's product had
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led to failure of defendant's business. When the first round of discussions
ended with the parties far apart, I assumed that it would just be a
matter of time before the defendant came around. During the discovery
that followed the first settlement conference, however, the defendant
generated very substantial evidence in support of its counterclaim,
evidence that made it appear that the counterclaim might be worth
hundreds of thousands of dollars, thus completely overshadowing the
value of the original collection action.
I learned all this because during the first conference I managed to
suppress my judgmental instincts and to disguise my feelings about the
case. Instead of expressing my real but misconceived feelings, and
pressing the defendant to put some money on the table right away, I
suggested that the parties conduct discovery to try to educate each
other and me about the value of the counterclaim, and that thereafter
we would hold a follow-up conference. Had I disclosed, in the first
round of sessions, my true feelings about the case, I would have been
lost as an effective facilitator of subsequent negotiations. I would have
exposed a premature judgment, based not on the evidence in the case
at hand, but on cynicism born out of observing defendants in other
cases file essentially vapid counterclaims solely to gain some leverage
in settlement negotiations. The moral of this story is clear: it is important
to suspend both judgment itself and articulation of judgment until the
parties have developed sufficient evidence for you to have an opinion
that is in fact reliable.
At the close of each initial private session, it is very important that
the judge make sure that she knows what information is to remain
confidential. By taking the time to explicitly clarify this matter with
each lawyer, the judge accomplishes two things: she reduces the odds
that she will misunderstand what she is free to disclose and she increases
counsel's confidence in her by showing that she is self-conscious about
this important responsibility and is disciplined enough to be trusted.
When advocates trust the judge to keep their secrets they are more
likely to be open about their true positions, and the more open they
are about their positions, the better able the judge will be to identify
common ground or at least to assess prospects for making progress
toward it. The judge should take care to clarify what she is free to
disclose at the end of every private caucus session throughout the
negotiations. Judges should avoid any tendency to get sloppier about
this as the negotiations wear on into multiple rounds. This sloppiness
is especially likely to surface when the judge feels some momentum
building toward an agreement. When the judge senses such momentum,
she may tend to move quickly from side to side, trying to capitalize
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on the movement.6 5 This is the environment which is most conducive
to errors.
C. The Analysis Stage
After the initial round of private talks, which should be dominated
by the judge's listening to counsel, the host should begin shifting the
discussion into a more analytical mode. As this transition is made, the
judge should explain again to counsel that his goal is to help them
dissect the case systematically and objectively, with a view toward
developing as tightly reasoned a basis for estimating its value as possible.
The judge should also explain that he wants to focus on the liability
aspects of the case before turning to damages and before trying to come
up with overall valuations for settlement purposes. By focusing first on
the liability questions, the judge accomplishes two things: he encourages
an analytical tone and he avoids the areas of the case about which
people are most likely to be sensitive and emotional. His goal is to
promote a feeling that the process is dominated by reasoning and to
generate reason-based momentum before reaching the most emotionally
charged parts of the conference, which usually are those that involve
money.
On the other hand, because it is not wise for the judge to begin the
part of the conference in which he is most active by asking questions
that probe the areas where a lawyer or a party is likely to be the most
defensive, there may be cases where the wisest course during the analysis
stage is to focus first on the damages question. If analysis of liability
would force counsel or litigant to confront evidence or to discuss behavior
that is especially damning or embarassing, starting with the damages
aspect of the case might be the only way to try to develop some positive
momentum. It also might make sense to start with the damages issue
when everyone seems to recognize that the settlement value of the case
is relatively small. In that circumstance, discussing damages is not likely
to be threatening and counsel may appreciate the efficiency of moving
right to the center of things. Finally, it might make sense to work the
damages side first when the defendant is almost judgment proof, so
that regardless of the liability picture, there is very limited room for
maneuvering on the numbers, or when the plaintiff's principal interest
is in some special form of relief that might not be too painful for the
defendant to accomodate.
In any environment, however, there is a danger that if the judge
focuses first on the damages issues he will give the parties the impression
65. Id.
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that he already has formed a judgment about liability or that he is
more interested in disposing of the case than in understanding it. To
create either impression is to court disaster. The judge wants the lawyer
and litigants to feel, when he begins the analysis stage, that he has an
open mind, that he intends to form opinions about what is likely to
occur at trial only after carefully exploring the evidence and arguments
on both sides, and that the only kind of settlement he is interested in
promoting is one that the parties feel is fair. If he jumps too quickly
toward the bottom line (by probing positions on numbers right at the
outset), he does nothing to promote these kinds of feelings. So if the
judge decides to start with the damages issues, he should explain why
he is doing so, he is not making any assumptions about the liability
side of the case, and that his goal is to try to help the parties reason
toward a solution that everyone believes is fair.
There are many different tools that judges can use to move the
conference into an analaytical mode. The simplest and most straight-
forward tool consists of the judge asking questions of counsel. The second
tool lies in asking the lawyers to change hats, and, in private, to present
to the judge their opponent's best case. The third tool is for the judge
to demonstrate to each lawyer, again in private, how she would argue
the case if she represented the other side.
In most of my settlement conferences, especially in simpler cases, I
shift to the analytical stage simply by asking questions of each lawyer
in the second round of the private caucus sessions. Questions can be
used to achieve several different analytical ends: to fill holes left by
the lawyers' initial presentations, to probe the strength of evidence that
supports the parties' versions of key facts, to refine significant lines of
legal reasoning and to test the authority for them, and to explore how
parties respond to evidence described or reasoning advanced by their
opponents. I use such questions not only to move to a more sophisticated
level of understanding of the case, but also to attempt to establish my
own analytical credibility and to show counsel that I have a well-
developed grasp of the relevant evidence and law. There are some
significant advantages to using well-framed questions to establish your
credibility rather than the narratives of the case with which Judge
Mayer opens his conferences. 66 Beginning with a factual narrative risks
making a significant error or creating the impression of having already
formed judgments about contested issues. The judge runs neither of
these risks by simply asking questions, unless the questions are obviously
rhetorical or loaded with undefended assumptions. The judge can use
questions very effectively to demonstrate his command of the case by
incorporating into them evidentiary or factual details to which counsel
66. Supra note 52.
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have alluded in their preconference submissions.
He can also use your questions as tools to teach the lawyers about
their own cases. For example, the judge can ask a lawyer in a private
session to explain how the evidence he has generated satisfies each of
the elements he must prove to prevail on a particular theory or affirmative
defense. Such a question forces counsel to identify each of the requisite
elements, then to review his evidence to see if it fulfills his proof needs.
Or the question could hone in on a particular element of a legal theory
that the judge is unsure the evidence will satisfy, or on which he feels
counsel has not adequately focused. The question could be framed as
a hypothetical. Hypothetical questions are an excellent tool for exploring
parties' positions during the negotiation stage of the conference, but
they also can be used to good effect in the analytical stage.
Judges should understand that questions can have counterproductive
effects or at least can create adverse reactions. In the analytical envi-
ronment, there is a subtle psychological art to question-asking. Especially
in the early parts of the analytical stage, the judge should take care
not to put counsel on the defensive needlessly. Toward this end, it is a
good idea not to go for the analytical jugular with the first set of
questions. Instead, the judge should open with questions to which counsel
can respond relatively comfortably. The judge might begin with questions
whose answers are likely to be positive for the responding attorney's
client, or that probe areas in which counsel and his client are not likely
to be especially sensitive or to feel vulnerable. In some cases, this may
mean that the first few questions will be in areas of only marginal
significance. The judge endangers his analytical credibility if his ques-
tions remain at the periphery for too long, but there is a net gain if
the judge begins the questioning in ways that do not force counsel into
a self-protective mode right at the outset. The judge is more likely to
get movement later on if he permits people to have some positive feelings
in the beginning and to feel some sense of competence. On the other
hand, if the goal is to encourage both sides to appreciate the risks that
going to trial would create, obviously it is not effective to pose questions
that encourage counsel to focus at great length on the strong points in
their case.
Another reason for not going for the analytical jugular immediately
is that doing so risks creating the impression that the judge made up
his mind about the case before the conference started and that his
questions are merely a ritualistic camouflage for a hostile mind. One
of the judge's principal objectives in the analytical stage is to persuade
all parties that her movement toward an assessment of the case is careful
and logical. This impression can be compromised by questions that cut
too deeply at the outset of the negotiations.67
67. Simultaneously, however, the host of the conference must beware of the danger
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Judges should try to reduce the accusatory onus that seems implicit
in questions whose answers are significant and unfavorable to the re-
sponding party. It is healthier if the judge does not appear to be the
source of questions that might be perceived as hostile. One format that
can help achieve these ends is to pose the question(s) as a request to
help the judge prepare to deal with the lawyer on the other side. For
example, when the judge thinks there are strong rejoinders to a line of
reasoning that is being advanced by the lawyer with whom he is caucusing
he might say: "How should I expect your opponent to respond to that
line of reasoning [or to that evidence]? When I press this point with
him, what will he say? Help me anticipate."
Another format that deflects attention away from the judicial host
consists of ascribing a sensitive question or a powerful rejoinder argument
to opposing counsel. This tactic is only possible if opposing counsel has
in fact made the point and does not view it as confidential. If the
situation permits, the judge might say: "When we got to this point in
my last session with Ms. Jones [opposing counsel} she asked me how
you would rebut [a particular argument or testimony or other piece of
evidence]. When she asked me that question I found that I couldn't
come up with much of an answer. Could you help me here? What is
the response from your client's side?" This phraseology suggests another
device for reducing tensions that tough questions can generate: phrase
questions so that the judge is asking not for the position of the responding
lawyer, but for his client's position. There are circumstances in which
it will help move things along if the judge gives a lawyer with whom
he is meeting privately an opportunity to make it appear that it really
is his client who is to blame for taking an unreasonable position or who
has no good response to a strong point made by the other side. Phrasing
questions in this way has two positive effects: it permits an attorney to
use his client as an excuse (and thus to avoid personal embarrassment)
and it reinforces the emotional separation of counsel and client that is
essential to good lawyering and healthy negotiations.
The second tool that can be used by a judge to advance the analytical
ball is to ask each attorney, during the private sessions, to switch
adversarial hats and present the "best case" for the opposition. To make
this exercise worthwhile, it is important for the judge to urge each
of misleading counsel into thinking that she is impressed by a line of argument or evidence
that she in fact believes is weak or patently implausible. There is a risk that a judge will
create such a misleading impression if she does not respond at all, or she nods in apparent
approval, at the close of a presentation by counsel that she in fact regards as thoroughly
unpersuasive. At such a point the judge should ask a general question whose purpose is
to alert counsel to the fact that she is skeptical. The judge may say, for example, "Do
you think thdt line of argument will sell? Let's take up some other questions I have first,
then come back to take another look at this position."
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lawyer to be as specific as possible, i.e., to ask each lawyer to articulate
the legal theory that seems strongest for the other side and then to
specify the evidence that offers the most support for that theory. The
judge wants each lawyer to see the case, to the extent possible, through
the eyes of her opponent and thus both to appreciate the other side's
point of view and to see more clearly some of the points where her
own case might be less than impregnable.
If counsel resist the judge's suggestions that they present the other
side's best case, or if their presentations are too self-serving to serve
the intended purpose, he might turn to the third tool. The judge may
suggest that for the purpose of refining everyone's comprehension of
the competing views, he will play devil's advocate and present, privately
to one side at a time, the opposing party's best case. Undertaking to
"lawyer the case" against one side at a time can be both very effective
and very risky. A judge who decides to use this technique must explain
what he is doing and why, and must be sure that each lawyer (or each
lawyer-client team) clearly understands that he is going to do the same
thing to each side in successive private sessions.
I destroyed my effectiveness, by destroying the appearance of my
impartiality, in a conference in which I failed to make this clear. In a
private session with the lawyers for one side, I said, without warning,
that I would like to "lawyer" the case against their client. Then I
proceeded to demonstrate how I would present the matter at trial,
emphasizing the arguments and evidence most damaging to the party
whose lawyers I was addressing. I do not know how telling my advocacy
was; I know only that the lawyers who watched me concluded that I
had essentially been converted by their opponents and that I had lost
all semblance of neutrality. These lawyers also expressed great fear that
the effect of my contribution to the settlement conference had been to
intensify their opponent's commitment to a position that they considered
patently unreasonable. Needless to say, I did not help to settle the case.
My error consisted of failing to explain, before I launched my pres-
entation, that I was going to play the same kind of devil's advocate
role for both sides. I also failed to make it clear that I had not shared
with their opponent, and would not share with him, my views about
how to argue the case most effectively from his side. It is very important
that counsel not infer that you are coaching the other side in how best
to present its case. In the case I just described, I had permitted the
lawyers for one side to infer not only that I had reached a one-sided
conclusion about how the case ought to come out, but also that I was
helping the other side prepare its trial arguments. Permitting counsel
to draw these inferences had disastrous consequences.
What should the judicial host do when he simply does not understand
some aspect of the case or the relevant law? Rather than risk all
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credibility by pretending to understand and then making a statement
or asking a question that reveals his ignorance or confusion, he should
ask the lawyers to teach him. No judge can be expected to have mastered
every area of law; nor are judges expected to understand the evidentiary
background of given cases as thoroughly as counsel should. Attorneys
are likely to have greater confidence in the judge's ultimate assessment
of the case if they know that he has worked conscientiously to build a
reliable base for his opinion. Moreover, judges should keep in mind that
it is the lawyers' job to teach them their cases. If the judge does not
understand, the lawyers have failed as teachers. Thus a judge should
feel no compunction about interrupting when counsel says something
he does not understand and asking him to explain.
Near the end of the analysis stage, after the judge has worked
carefully through the relevant evidence and law with counsel, he should
decide whether or not it would be wise, before launching the negotiation
stage of the conference, to make explicit his assessment of the persuasive
power of specific evidence, or legal arguments, or the relative overall
strength of the parties' positions. As the results of the A.B.A. survey
make clear, lawyers feel that it is very important that judges who host
settlement conferences express opinions and offer analyses of the case.68
The survey results, however, do not help judges identify the juncture
at which they should share their views, or how they should communicate
them. It is inevitable that at least some of the questions the judge asks
will serve as clues to his or her views, and in many cases it might be
wisest for the judge not to be more explicit about his feelings about
the parties' positions until he has given them a chance to try to negotiate
a solution. There is a risk that by being too explicit about views too
early a judge will compromise his ability to serve as a facilitator or to
help move the parties onto common ground.
A dimension of this risk is that if one party concludes that the judge
has formed a judgment hostile to him on the merits, he may be so
disappointed that he will refuse to share additional information during
the negotiation stage, perhaps even refuse to disclose privately any useful
information about how he might be willing to bargain toward a solution.
Similarly, a party who feels that the judge's view of the merits favors
its opponent may fear that the judge will conspire with the other side
in the negotiations and manipulate the process in order to secure a
favorable outcome for the opposition. If the judge loses one party's
trust, his ability to get him to be honest and flexible as he makes or
responds to offers or demands may be seriously impaired.
Another reason for the judge to think twice before sharing his views
of the merits of the case with counsel before the negotiation stage gets
68. W. BRAZIL, SETTLING CIVIL SuITs 2 (1985).
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seriously underway is that he may well need to use his views as
ammunition in the skirmishes that will follow as part of the negotiation
process. When the negotiations get serious, the judge is likely to need
some intellectual leverage to get the parties to common ground. The
most obvious source of such leverage is his analysis of the strengths
and weaknesses of various aspects of the parties' positions. If the judge
exposes his analysis too fully too early, he may have nothing left to use
as leverage at the crucial points in the negotiation stage. Thus it is not
wise for the judge to volunteer his entire analysis before the dealing
gets serious; instead, he should keep in reserve a few substantial points
or comments for use during that last push toward closure.
If the judge decides to share some of his views before moving fully
into the negotiation stage, either because the lawyers press him for them
or because some comments on the merits seem necessary to lay the
proper foundation for the negotiations, the judge might express his
opinions with obvious qualifiers or in some tentative or hypothetical
form, and focus his comments on discrete subparts of the case. It is
not a good idea to make a prediction, at this stage, about who is likely
to win on the merits and what the size of the judgment might be (if
you think the plaintiff will prevail). It is wiser for the judge to save
opinions on these larger questions for the latter part of the negotiation
stage.
D. The Negotiation Stage
The deeper and more thorough the parties and the judge have been
during the analysis stage, the easier the negotiation stage is likely to
be. There are negotiations, of course, in which reason plays a secondary
role, acting as a cosmetic cover for a game in which counsel or parties
rely primarily on manipulation of economic or psychological power.
There also are situations in which emotions dictate positions that reason
would never endorse, and cases in which the room for reasoning and
for creativity is severely restricted simply because the defendant has
little money. In most cases of any substance, however, the dominant
force in the settlement dynamic is reasoning about self-interest. And
when reasoning is the dominant force, the quality of the analysis stage
will determine the productivity of the negotiation stage. Judges should
not be in a hurry to get to the negotiations per se; they should resist
the temptation to steam ahead to the numbers.
While it is true that the judicial host of a settlement conference
contributes most by helping the parties test and refine their analyses
of the evidence and law, it also is true that judges can contribute a
great deal by helping the litigants search creatively for packages of
terms that might be acceptable to both sides. One valuable contribution
a judge can make is to bring a fresh perspective to the way the parties
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define their objectives and fresh ideas to the search for solutions. Thus,
near the beginning of the negotiation stage, judges should make broad
inquiries designed to flush out the parties' true objectives, to get a sense
of how the parties prioritize various items on their wish lists, and to
determine whether it is feasible to recast some of the parties' goals in
ways that make satisfaction of both sides more likely.
In searching for possible elements of settlement packages, the judge
should look beyond the litigation itself to the parties' situations in the
"outside world." Looking at each party's extra-litigation situation hol-
istically, the judge should first attempt to determine what the litigants'
need and want most. Then, most importantly, the judge should go on
to ask: "what could the defendant do for the plaintiff that the plaintiff
could not do for itself, or that the plaintiff could not do as efficiently
or as effectively for itself?" Of course, the judge should ask the same
question from the opposite perspective as well: "what is the plaintiff in
a better position to do for the defendant than the defendant could do
for itself?" Answers to these kinds of questions can help the judge
develop possible bases for settlement that have little to do with the
substance of the underlying action but still achieve important ends for
the parties. A party who helps develop this kind of solution to a litigation
problem can feel that he has done something creative and that he is
using his resources in a constructive way. Since litigation is so often
dominated by negative feelings, and so often seems like an essentially
destructive and wasteful exercise, proposals for settlement that make
people feel creative and constructive have a special appeal.
At the beginning of the negotiation stage the judge also should
attempt to ascertain what each litigant could give up with the least
pain. Sometimes this will be cash; sometimes it will be an annuity;
sometimes it will be an apology. Sometimes it will be a commitment
to buy products in the future, to supply services at below-market rates,
or to refrain from engaging in certain acts or business activities. For
example, a business that is having cash-flow problems might find it
much less painful to make commitments about future business than to
come up with a big cash settlement, even when the full cost of the
future business (on terms favorable to another litigant) is considerably
greater than the value of the cash. If the judge can identify the kinds
of things a litigant can give up with the least pain, he should start the
negotiations by first seeking concessions in these areas. The judge's goal
is to use concessions or agreements in the least painful areas early in
the negotiations to build a sense of momentum and to encourage each
side to view the other as proceeding in good faith. The more momentum
and trust the judge can build before tackling the most difficult or
painful apsects of the negotiations the better the chances of reaching
a settlement.
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In a great many cases there is really only one subject of the settlement
negotiations: money. In cases that are only about money, and money
up front, the judicial host of a settlement conference must make a
couple of sensitive judgments: which juncture would be appropriate for
counsel to put their opening numbers on the table and what is the most
constructive way to have these numbers articulated? Although identifying
the appropriate time to begin the bidding is not easy, I have two
suggestions. The first suggestion is that you discourage counsel from
putting "serious" numbers on the table until you are satisfied that the
lawyers have done real justice to the analytical stage of the process.
Prior to the conference in many cases the parties will have exchanged
offers and demands which they know are outside the true settlement
range of the case. Sometimes they will include somewhat more realistic
figures in their written settlement conference statements. In most cases,
however, counsel understand that the "real bidding" does not begin
until the conference is underway. Judges should not permit this bidding
to begin until well into the conference, after pressing counsel to think
carefully and systematically about the strengths and weaknesses of each
party's case.
Second, if a judge senses that the parties are miles apart in assessments
of the case, but that there is more discovery or investigative work to
be done and that a follow-up conference is a real possibility, the judge
should discourage the lawyers from putting "serious" numbers on the
table at the first conference. Prospects for ultimate success can be
damaged if the parties begin what are supposed to be serious negotiations
by articulating figures that are mutually insulting. Moreover, the figures
the parties put on the table in this first session are likely to become
benchmarks against which counsel forever after will measure their
achievement as negotiators. If a lawyer (or party) measures his success
by how little he moves from his initial position, and this initial position
is miles away from the figure it will take to settle the case, the
negotiations are in trouble. Rather than invite this kind of trouble,
judges should tell parties whom they know will be poles apart that the
waters should not be polluted by premature numbers and postpone
discussion of specific figures until the second conference, to be held
after additional discovery or other homework has been completed and
after everyone has had a chance to digest what they learned at the
first conference.
On the other hand, if the date set for trial of the matter is very
close and the evidentiary background of the case has been so thoroughly
developed that a judge senses that a follow-up session is not likely, the
parties should not be permitted to leave the negotiations before the
judge is satisfied that their numbers are in fact so far apart that there
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is no chance of reaching an agreement. 69 Lawyers can be very misleading
about where their clients really stand and sometimes leap the gap
between analysis and settlement figures in mysterious ways. Since judges
in many cases cannot divine the parties' real positions, they must be
sure not to lose last opportunities to settle by failing to push for numbers
when the process is winding to a halt. In these settings, I like to use
hypothetical questions to probe for the range each party would be willing
to take seriously. At the end of negotiations, I might say, for example:
"I have no reason to believe the plaintiff would take a figure in this
range, but would your client consider making an offer somewhere in
the vicinity of $100,000 if that would seal the deal?"
Whether it is in this last ditch context, or, much more typically,
earlier in the negotiation process, the judge will have to make a difficult
decision about how he wants numbers first articulated. Should the judge
ask counsel to specify their offers and demands before she exposes her
assessment of the value of the case, or should the judge go forward
first, indicating the dollar range within which she thinks a reasonable
settlement would fall? When I first started hosting settlement conferences
I was shocked at how far apart and how unrealistic the lawyers' opening
offers and demands were. Sensible and proximate positions were arrived
at through ritualistic exchanges. I responded by developing a system in
which I would articulate a valuation range before permitting counsel
to put their client's numbers on the table. The breadth of a properly
articulated range varies according to the interplay of many factors,
including the size of the case, the level of confidence that the judge
has in his analysis, and how well-developed the evidence was by the
time of the conference. The purpose of this approach is to impose some
realism and restraint on the lawyers' bidding and to encourage everyone
to enter the same valuation range before launching the serious negotiations.
I am not sure whether my system worked. I gradually abandoned it
as I discovered inherent risks that weigh against its employment. One
such risk is that the judge's valuation range will alter the expectations
with which parties entered the conference in a direction that makes it
more difficult to reach an agreement. The following story illustrates
this point. Prior to the conference, the plaintiff had decided that he
would settle for a figure between $60,000 and $80,000. The defendant
came to the conference prepared to offer between $50,000 and $65,000.
The judge who hosted the negotiations did not know these figures. After
conducting his analysis of the case, and without asking for offers or
69. Many times I have inferred, from the parties' comments during the analysis stage,
that the odds of finding common ground were essentially zero, only to discover, as I
pushed in the waning minutes for hard figures, that the positions the parties were prepared
to live with were in fact quite close.
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demands, he announced his valuation range: $80,000-$100,000. This
announcement caused the plaintiff to become more rigid and demanding
in subsequent negotiations: he refused to consider the figures at the
lower end of the range he had developed prior to the conference.
However, the judge's views failed to move the defendant into the higher
range that had become necessary to satisfy the plaintiff. As a result, a
case that in all likelihood would have settled without any expression of
judicial opinion did not settle because the judge's views made one party
more demanding than he had been before hearing these views. This
result might have been avoided if the range the judge had articulated
had been appreciably broader, but ranges that are too broad will not
be useful. It is arguable, of course, that the judge's valuation range
prevented a miscarriage of justice and this is more important than
securing a settlement. The persuasiveness of this argument depends on
the accuracy of the judge's valuation. Unfortunately, it is very difficult
to know the true settlement value of a case until after a jury returns
a verdict.
A judge who articulates her valuation range before pressing counsel
to make realistic offers or demands also risks losing credibility with one
or both sides if her range is too far from the boundaries identified by
the lawyers. If both lawyers are convinced that the case is worth less
than $100,000, but the judge suggests a settlement range of $150,000
- $200,000, counsel may not take very seriously her views about other
matters.
Even when my valuation range was not perceived by the lawyers as
naive, I felt that articulating it too soon sometimes made it appear that
I had lined up with one side. Unless my range was very broad, it almost
invariably was more favorable to one side, and being perceived as having
lined up with one side, even after proceeding thoughtfully through the
analysis stage, seemed to compromise my ability to facilitate the process
thereafter. The side against whom I appeared to' have moved would
become less trusting, less open, and more rigid. Endorsing a given
valuation range necessarily implies at least partial acceptance of some
arguments and/or evidence and at least partial rejection of others. When
a judge implicitly tips her hand in favor of one side, the other side
may respond with resentment. Moreover, unless it is a type of case with
which the judge has had a great deal of experience, and the evidence
and law have been very well developed, there is a real risk that when
the judge moves toward an overall valuation he or she will simply be
projecting biases or making unreliable guesses.
Not long ago I made this kind of mistake in a large business case.
After hearing presentations for about an hour on each side and probing
both sides with questions, I obliquely suggested to both sides, in private
sessions, an overall valuation that was much more consistent with the
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plaintiffs wishes than with the defendant's. I promptly endeared myself
to the plaintiff, but alienated the defendant and essentially destroyed
my usefulness as a negotiation facilitator. Sometime later I had occasion
to revisit some of the substance of the case in another setting. Gradually
I realized that my initial valuation of the case had been quite naive. I
had been guilty of myopically generalizing from my personal standards
to the business community. In other words, I had applied to the corporate
defendant the rather puritanical and demanding standards that I apply
to myself as a judge. I had ignored the standards of the marketplace,
and thus failed to apply the criteria that were most likely relevant to
the commercial case before me. By being too personally moralistic, I
lost touch with the norms that would in all likelihood have been used
to assess the behavior of the parties. This error in judgment made my
valuation unreliable and caused the defendant, who apparently under-
stood what I was doing, to lose confidence in my feedback and sug-
gestions. This is the kind of error, of course, that one could make at
any stage of a negotiation, but I would have been less likely to make
it if I had let the negotiations move at their own pace, instead of rushing
in to impose my feelings and figures.
These observations are not intended to suggest that the judicial host
should never express her overall assessment of the case. As the A.B.A.
survey shows, lawyers want judges to express their views.70 The question
is not whether the judge should suggest a valuation range, but when,
or under what conditions. 7' The judge's wiser course is to play his
ultimate valuation cards closer to his chest until late in the negotiation
stage, after he has a well-developed sense of what the lawyers think
the case is worth and after he has attempted to steer them toward a
settlement solely on the bases of their views. By holding back his own
valuation, the judge preserves his options, maintains the confidence of
both sides, and keeps in reserve his most powerful intellectual ammunition.
For judges who have less time or patience for this business, or who
for any other reason decide to articulate their own valuation before
soliciting the "serious" offers and demands from the lawyers, a cautious
course is advisable. The judge should expose his valuation in an obviously
tentative mode, surrounded by qualifiers, and in a range of figures that
leaves a good deal of room to maneuver.
If a judge decides to press for more "serious" offers or demands
before making explicit his own views on valuation, the judge should
make a speech to the lawyers, privately, one at a time, in which the
judge vigorously encourages them to start with a figure that is neither
(1) clearly extreme nor (2) their client's real bottom line. I have found
70. W. BRAZIL, supra note 68, at 77.
71. Id.
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that lawyers react quite positively when I explain openly my theories
about how to conduct negotiations in ways that maximize their pro-
ductivity. Thus, I tell counsel why I think it is a bad idea to start with
a number that is too extreme or that is in fact their bottom line. I
point out that a figure that is obviously extreme damages the credibility
of the person who purports to put it on the table. When a lawyer makes
an offer or demand that no reasonable person would take seriously, he
needlessly increases the risk that the other side will not believe him
later when he puts his client's real figure on the table. When a lawyer
who has a history of making big bluffs gets to his client's real bottom
line, he will have a very hard time getting anyone to take him seriously.
A settlement judge should point out to counsel that a lawyer who
puts absurd numbers on the table needlessly jeopardizes his credibility
in other areas. A lawyer will be more effective in settlement negotiations
if the judge and the other lawyers are inclined to believe what she says
about evidence that has not yet been the subject of discovery or legal
authority that has not been searchingly probed. For example, a lawyer
who has interviewed a witness who has not yet been deposed will be
more effective in settlement negotiations if the judge and the other
lawyers believe what she says about what the witness will say and about
how credible he will be. Similarly, a lawyer will be more effective if
the other participants in the negotiations believe her when she says she
can produce documents with specified contents, or that her client will
agree to refrain from certain acts if a settlement can be reached. A
judge to whom an incredible offer or demand is made in a private
session should explain the credibility risks to counsel rather than simply
passing the offer along to the other side.
The judge also should point to other negative effects of making clearly
unrealistic offers or demands. She should tell counsel that she has seen
many settlement conferences come to an abrupt halt because one side's
figure was so extreme that it provoked nothing but ill will and resentment
in the opposition. She should emphasize that putting a patently unrealistic
figure on the table gives the other side no incentive to negotiate in
good faith or to respond at all. At best, making an unrealistic offer
inspires an equally unrealistic response. At worst, it terminates negotiations.
Having emphasized these points, the judge should go on to explain
why, in her experience, it also is not a good idea for a party to open
settlement negotiations with its real bottom line figure. Of course, parties
rarely are tempted to open with their bottom lines, but explaining why
doing so is not a good idea gives the judge an opportunity to make
counsel a little more self conscious about the affect that various moves
they might make could have on the negotiation process itself. In this
spirit, the judge should explain that the lawyer who announces that his
opening figure is in fact his client's real bottom line will be perceived
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as making some form of power play. A move that is perceived as a
crude power play can stop the negotiation process in its tracks. Moreover,
a lawyer who opens the negotiation stage by presenting a figure that
is carved in stone seems arrogant. She in effect seems to be saying: "I
have learned all there is to learn about this case; my analysis is infallible;
I have forseen all the conceiveable scenarios; and there is nothing that
could happen or that I might hear that would cause me to recommend
that my client make some adjustment in the figure he has put on the
table." A lawyer who really feels this way is a fool. A lawyer who
projects this image makes few friends and encourages none of the good
will that can contribute so much to the negotiations.
By opening with the bottom line figure a lawyer also needlessly paints
himself into a "face corner"; he makes it virtually impossible to change
positions without losing face. To announce at the outset that his figure
is as low or high as his client will go gives counsel no room to maneuver.
The judge should point out that he has never seen a negotiation in
which some room to maneuver was not essential.
Building from this point, the judge should go on to describe the
following important aspects of the psychology of negotiations. The li-
kelihood of any given negotiation being successful improves appreciably
if the process permits each side, and each major actor, to emerge with
a sense of accomplishment. The lawyers, in particular, need to feel that
the work they have done at the conference on behalf of their clients
has made a difference, and that because of their efforts, their clients'
position at the end of the negotiations is better than it was projected
to be at the beginning. This feeling of achievement is an important part
of a lawyer's sense of professional competence. One of the most negative
effects of opening a negotiation with a bottom line figure is that it
deprives the other side of any opportunity to feel that it has achieved
something during the negotiations. And since in virtually every nego-
tiation each side is asking the other to make some kind of compromise,
it is especially important that each lawyer's opening offer or demand
leave enough room for the other side to feel, at the end, that it has
received or achieved something in return for what it is giving up.
The judge should add that there is a much better chance of the
parties reaching an agreement if, at the close of the process, they feel
that each side has moved a roughly equal distance or has made conces-
sions of roughly equal magnitude. The more the process seems to reflect
this basic sense of balance, the more the parties are likely to feel that
the result is fair. A lawyer who starts the negotiations by announcing
his client's bottom line eliminates the possibility of generating this sense
of parity of movement and equality of compromise that is so important
to many people in this setting. By making these points explicitly near
the beginning of the negotiation stage, the judge improves the likelihood
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that the lawyers will not thoughtlessly take positions detrimental to the
psychological environment and thereby reduce the odds of success.
The judge's most constructive course is to encourage both sides to
open the negotiations with figures that are in the ball park but not
right on home plate. The amount of room counsel should leave between
their opening figure and their bottom line varies from case to case and
may depend both on how confident they are in their analysis of the
case and on their judgment about how much movement from the initial
figures the other side is likely to need. If the other side is likely to
feel the need for a great deal of movement or for major concessions,
or if counsel knows that the other side is likely to open with an extreme
figure, it would be appropriate to leave more space between the opening
offer or demand and the real bottom line. The important point is to
get opening numbers that are sufficiently realistic to show good faith
and to offer the other side an incentive to respond in kind, but simul-
taneously leave room for the crucial balancing.
How does a settlement judge get the lawyers and their clients to
play by these rules? The best way is to explain the governing concerns
and then to openly ask counsel to follow the rules. Whether the lawyers
will abide by the request is uncertain. Nonetheless, a judge who makes
the effort will reduce the odds that counsel will needlessly hurt prospects
for success by taking counterproductive positions. The same judge,
however, must be careful not to accept too literally the positions proferred
by counsel. The moral is: be slow to conclude that any given position
a party has taken will not change or that significant movement is
impossible.
What should the judge do, as the host of the conference, if, despite
all his speeches, the opening figure a lawyer offers, in private caucus
with the judge, is patently outrageous? He should bite his tongue. I
destroyed my usefulnesss in a settlement conference I was hosting not
long ago when I got visibly angry after a lawyer proposed a figure for
settlement that I considered ridiculous. A much more constructive
response would have been to say, simply, "I don't understand the
reasoning that would lead to that number. Would you please walk me
through the steps that got you there. That will help me present and
explain your client's position to the opposition." If counsel cannot explain
adequately the basis for his position, the judge might persuade him to
change it by pointing out that the judge will not have any leverage
with the other side, when he meets privately with it, unless he can
present a rationally defensible position.
If counsel persists in making an offer or demand whose justification
remains implausible or unpersuasive, a judge might respond by professing
confusion. The judge might then inquire if some parts of the case have
not been discussed yet. This kind of question can serve several purposes.
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It gives a lawyer who has client control problems an opportunity to tell
the judge about them. It also might help flush out a hidden agenda,
although it is not likely that counsel will unburden their souls to the
judge about objectives that have nothing to do with the merits of the
litigation. The principal purpose of the question is to communicate to
counsel the conviction that his valuation is appreciably out of line, and
that unless he can come up with a reasonable justification for it the
judge cannot in good conscience try to persuade the other side to take
it seriously. This question puts the ball back in counsel's court and
implicitly urges him to reconsider his position, perhaps adjusting it in
the next round of negotiations.
Many lawyers resist initiating the negotiations, protesting that it is
not fair to make their client bid against himself. If one side has put a
number on the table that is clearly more realistic than the other's, it
would be reasonable for the lawyer for the more realistic side to resist
making unreciprocated movement and the judge should press the lawyer
with the less reasonable figure to move first. As long as the judge can
articulate a clear basis for the conclusion that the one figure is appre-
ciably more realistic than the other, the judge may tell the side being
asked for movement that it is because the figure their opponent has on
the table is closer to the judge's valuation of the case.
The judge's job is more difficult when the figure of neither side is
more realistic and each side resists movement because it does not want
to bid against itself. The judge may pursue several courses of action
geared toward initiating negotiations. One is to challenge directly the
assumptions that seem to underlie the resistance to bidding against
oneself. To be successful, the judge must explicitly challenge each
assumption and feeling underlying the resistance.
One source of resistance to being the first to make a new move
toward more realistic ground builds from concerns about fairness. Law-
yers assert that it simply is unfair to make their client bid against
himself. That position might make sense if the other side were not
bidding at all, or were bidding much less realistically. But if the other
side is bidding, and its bid is not clearly less realistic than the bid
made by the side to whom you are talking, the fairness argument is
unconvincing. A judge might ask the resisting lawyer: "Why would it
be any more fair to force the other side to move first, to bid against
itself?" Since, in this situation, there is no basis for distinguishing the
positions of the parties, there is no basis, in reason or fairness, on which
the court could decide which of the two sides to ask to make the next
change in its position. A judge might explain that any choice between
the parties would be arbitrary, then use this explanation to support the
suggestion that the judge (as the neutral) simply flip a coin to see who
makes the next move.
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Another possibility would be to attempt to reconstruct the history of
offers and demands to determine which party made the most recent
change, then suggest to his opponent that it is his turn. If neither side
has put a figure on the table, the judge can explain that it is customary
for the plaintiff to begin negotiations by making a demand. If both
sides have put several figures on the table and it is not clear whose is
most recent, the judge might ask both parties to submit secret figures
to him simultaneously in writing. The judge could indicate that he
would not disclose the figures without the parties' permission, and that
he would not ask for that permission unless, after reviewing the figures
privately, he felt that there was some meaningful chance that the parties
might ultimately find common ground.7
2
A judge who questions the latter option might prefer to try to persuade
one side to take the high road. The judge might say to the lawyer:
"Both sides have put arguably comparable figures on the table. I have
no basis for choosing one side or the other to be the next to move. Yet
we all know there will be more movement, and that we can't make any
progress until there is. I would be most grateful if you would take the
bull by the horns here and help me get things moving by putting a
new number on the table. This will signal your client's good faith and
demonstrate that you are more interested in seriously exploring the
possibilities of reaching an agreement than in keeping score or counting
turns. By giving me a new number you give me leverage with the other
side; you remove its excuses and enable me to press it to respond in
the same good faith that your client will have demonstrated."
The difficulty with this kind of appeal is that it does not address
the other concerns that inspire resistance to bidding against oneself.
One such concern is fear of appearing weaker than the other side and
more anxious to settle. When a judge senses that this fear is present
and active, he might say something to the effect: "I simply don't
understand why some lawyers feel that it is a sign of weakness to be
the first to move toward a range of numbers that we all know is more
realistic. Rather than being a sign of weakness to be the first to move,
it seems to me to be a sign of strength. Rather than evincing some
lack of confidence, it seems to me to demonstrate that you are so
confident in your ability to value the case, and your ability to control
yourself in the negotiation process, that you are not concerned about
such pettiness as who appears to be the first to make a constructive
move. I have always felt that it is the weaker lawyers who hide behind
these ritualistic concerns. You know the range of numbers beyond which
72. This is a tool for breaking logjams that Chief Circuit Judge Gerald Weatherington
of Miami, Florida, has used successfully.
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you will go to trial; let's put some pressure on the other side by making
a move in the direction of that range. You don't have to actually get
into that range with this move, but let's head in that direction."
A third source of resistance to bidding against oneself may be a
hope that runs through a lawyer's mind along the following lines: "If
I hide my real valuation of the case, and the range of figures within
which my client really would settle, and force the other side to show
its more serious cards first, maybe I will be able to dupe the other side
into accepting a deal that is much better for my client than he would
in fact be willing to accept. If I force the other side to go first, maybe
I will get a better deal even than I think I can get." To counter this
source of resistance to being the first to move toward more realistic
ground, the judge should make a statement like the following (assuming
he really feels this way): "My discussions of the case with the other
side persuade me that its assessment is relatively solid and that it is
not going to propose or accept a figure that is naive. It knows that
there will be no settlement at either extreme, and that there is going
to have to be appreciable movement on both sides if we are going to
reach an agreement. If I were to press it now for another figure, it
would not come back with something unpredictably generous to your
client. Instead, the figure would be a cautious move toward territory
somewhere between the two positions now on the table. So, by getting
the bail rolling you will not be giving up an opportunity for some
windfall; there will be no windfall in this case. So please give me a
new number so we can get this process in gear."
If none of these relatively direct approaches works, a judge might
try the use of hypotheticals to break the ice." When trying to get a
lawyer in a private caucus to be the first to make a semi-serious
settlement proposal, a judge might consider using the following approach:
"To get things moving constructively here, I would like to pose hypo-
theticals to both sides. By proceeding through hypotheticals, we can get
a sense of the direction in which each side might be willing to head
but without committing anyone to anything. We can explore the pos-
sibilities without asking that actual new figures be put on the table.
But, I don't want the assumptions that underlie the hypotheticals I use
with either side to be completely divorced from reality, and thus fun-
damentally misleading. So, for this to work, I need you to indicate
whether the range in the hypothetical I propose might, at least under
some circumstances, be somewhere near the range that your client might
73. Judge Eugene F. Lynch of the United States District Court for the Northern
District of California (formerly on the superior court bench in San Francisco) introduced
the author to the use of hypotheticals in settlement negotiations and has developed great
skill in employing this tool.
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consider. I don't want you to indicate whether your client would make
an offer in that range; all I want is some indication that the range is
not so far off that it would be counterproductive to mention it to the
other side in a hypothetical context. So, what I'd like to do is go to
the other side and say: 'These figures are not on the table, but I need
to use some tool to get a sense of where all of us might be, so I'd like
to know how your client might respond if the defendant were to put
together a package with the following kinds of components and with
cash up front in the range of X to Y.' If you will permit me to pose
this kind of hypothetical to the other side, I think we could make some
progress here. What do you say?" If a judge does use hypotheticals
like this, it is imperative that he make it clear to the side at whom
they are directed that its opponent has not made commitments to the
numbers or ranges used in the hypothetical question.
There are other ways that settlement conference hosts can use hy-
potheticals effectively. For example, if a judge feels that there is an
element of one side's evidence or argument that is weak or vulnerable
to an adverse legal ruling, the judge might communicate this feeling
indirectly and probe for possible movement by asking the following kind
of hypothetical: "If, after hearing all the arguments, the trial judge
were to rule against you on X key evidentiary issue, might your client
think the case would be worth a figure somewhere in the - to
range?" Another example of this kind of question focuses on
the persuasiveness of specified key evidence. A judge might ask: "If
you could forsee that the jury would find that X were true, what is
the range of figures in which your client might place its settlement
valuation of this case?"
If the approaches described above fail to persuade the parties to
move, or if, after they have moved, they remain separated by a substantial
gap, a settlement judge can resort to a riskier device that I have used
with some success. At some point, after considerable analysis and
negotiation, the judge, as host of the conference, probably will form a
judgment about what the dollar range (or package of other elements)
is that the parties will have to enter if there is to be a settlement. This
is not a judgment about what the settlement figure ought to be; it is
not the judge's independent assessment of the value of the case. It is
his best objective guess about the kind of number it will take to settle
the case, based on his judgment about how low the plaintiff might be
willing to go or how high the defense might rise up. Once a judge has
formed a judgment of this kind he may be able to use it to persuade
one or both parties to move toward it. A judge might address the party
who appears farthest away from the requisite numbers along the following
lines: "I have listened to and probed both sides for quite some time
now. Having done this in hundreds of other settlement conferences, I
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have a sense of the dollar range that it will take to settle this case.
The figures I am going to outline here do not necessarily reflect my
personal values or my personal assessment of what is likely to happen
at trial. I am acting, instead, as an objective observer, trying to share
with both sides what I perceive as a fact of life in this negotiation. I
am sharing this observation with both sides to see if there is any chance
of making it. If there is a chance of this case settling, the figure
apparently will have to fall somewhere between X and Y. I don't want
any commitment from you at this juncture, but could you tell me
whether there is a chance that your client might approach this range?"
The theory behind this approach, of course, is that this kind of opinion
might serve as the cold shower of realism that a party needs to persuade
it to make meaningful movement. However, you should use this device
only late in negotiations because it essentially pressures the parties to
"fish or cut bait." As such, it can backfire, resulting in an abrupt end
to the conference.
It is important that a settlement judge not take too literally what
lawyers say about their clients' settlement positions. This means, among
other things, that it is a serious mistake to give up at the first sign, or
even the second or third signs, of impasse.74 When a judge arrives at
an apparent impasse he should not give in, but instead return, at least
for a short time, to the analysis stage. A judge should go back to the
evidence and the law. He must ask the attorneys to detail the line of
reasoning that leads to the figures their clients have put on the table.
The judge must make them proceed systematically; he cannot permit
them to skip elements of their claim or defense or to slide past any
significant assumption in their damage calculation. He must make sure,
in other words, that their reasoning is tight and linear. He needs to
point out every assumption that is not fully supported and each weak
link in the evidentiary chain. He should gently but persistently try to
soften each side's conviction about its figures by reasoning about risks.
If more vigorous analytical review of the parties' claims and defenses
does not yield the necessary movement, the judge might consider resorting
to one or more of the tools for breaking logjams described below.
1. Substantive and Procedural Ideas for Breaking Logjams. One of
the first things a judge should consider when negotiations have hit an
impasse is simply to take a break. Sometimes parties need time to
integrate what they have learned during the conference with the infor-
mation and perspectives they developed before it began. Sometimes they
need emotional or psychological space to adjust the expectations or
hopes with which they entered the negotiations. Sometimes tempers
74. Author's personal experience.
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need to cool or anxieties need to subside. So, when things look bleak,
take a break. A judge might invite the participants to return in a few
days or perhaps even in a few hours. If it appears that movement is
impossible without additional information, a judge should help the parties
develop a plan to complete specified discovery or investigative work
and set a date on which they will return for a follow-up session.
In addition to giving the parties the space they need, and helping
them plan how to acquire additional information, the settlement judge
can make a significant contribution by suggesting forms of compensation
or elements of settlement packages that could supplement or serve as
alternatives to straight cash payments. These kinds of ideas can be
especially useful when the principal defendant has cash flow problems
or for some other reason is having difficulty moving toward the kind
of cash figure it would take to produce a settlement. The list of
supplements or alternatives to cash payments that follows is by no means
exhaustive; a judge's goal should be to look for similar items or exchanges
that the situation of the parties before him might make possible.
1. mergers or buy-outs (consider guaranteeing key actors in the
company that will no longer exist attractive positions in the emerging
company);
2. joint ventures;
3. licensing agreements;
4. pay-off in products;
5. pay-off in shares of stock;
6. pay-off in future business or discounts on future purchases;
7. a commitment to help find customers or clients for the opposing
party;
8. changing the terms of a continuing, long-range relationship;
9. offering an apology;
10. arranging for a press release (e.g., to trade papers or magazines,
attempting to correct negative impressisons about a party made as
a result of the events leading up to the suit);
11. corporate defendant rehiring terminated employee or securing a
job for plaintiff at another corporation.
Another idea that might break a logjam is to suggest to the parties
that they jointly retain a neutral expert to form an opinion about the
issues that separate them or to propose a plan or framework for a
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possible settlement. The range of experts that can be useful in this
setting is almost limitless and includes physicians, scientists, electronic
specialists, engineers, market researchers, advertising specialists, invest-
ment counsellors, organizational consultants, accountants, and real estate
brokers. In one case I handled not long ago, the key to apportioning
fault between the defendant and the decedent was the answer to a
physics question: given the weight of the decedent, and the garments
he was wearing, how close to the intake channel of a jet engine he was
working on would he have had to have been to be sucked in during a
full-power test? When the parties came to our first settlement conference
without well-developed answers to this question, I saw a perfect oppor-
tunity to encourage a cost-effective settlement through the use of a
neutral expert. At the time of the first settlement conference, neither
party had spent a lot of money on discovery and the trial date was not
imminent. I suggested that the parties jointly retain an expert in whom
both had confidence and agree in advance that no matter what her
opinion turned out to be, neither party would be permitted to call her
at trial or to use her or her report in any way in connection with the
litigation at hand. The theory behind this suggestion was to create a
relatively inexpensive vehicle by which the parties could acquire an
expert, impartial, and confidential answer to the key question in the
case before investing a lot of money in the traditional forms of pretrial
jockeying. The parties could use the expert's answer as an important
factor in their negotiations but not be bound by it in any way.
In cases that involve multiple parties, a judge might consider sepa-
rating out and trying to get an agreement first with the party who
seems most flexible or exposed. By getting one party to accept terms
you might create a sense of momentum, or apprehension among the
others that they could be left sitting alone at trial.75 A similar strategy
involves separating out the defendant whose attorney is the most highly
regarded in the defense group and trying to strike a deal with that
lawyer's client. The theory here is that the other lawyers may be heavily
influenced by the route taken by their highly regarded colleague.
In mass tort situations, a settlement judge who is simultaneously
handling many individual claimants should consider working with the
lawyers to create heterogeneous groups of cases and then attempting to
get the parties to agree on a figure for each group rather than for each
claimant. 76 Claims arising out of exposure to asbestos can range from
trivial to enormous, with innumerable variations in between. Faced with
scores of asbestos-related claims, Judge Lynch and the lawyers with
75. CAL. CIv. CODE §1431.2 (West 1987).
76. Author's personal contact with Judge Lynch.
[Vol. 3:1 1987]
HOSTING SETTLEMENT CONFERENCES
whom he worked formed groups of about six cases each, with each
group including cases that covered a wide range of damages.77 In the
negotiations, the judge encouraged counsel to focus on the settlement
value of the groups as a whole.78 This grouping of diverse cases permitted
opposing counsel to disagree about the valuation of individual cases but
nonetheless agree about the total value of the group.79 Thus the grouping
created a vehicle by which differences of opinion could be neutralized.
This approach can work effectively only when one lawyer or one law
firm represents all the plaintiffs, or when there is a close working
relationship among plaintiffs' counsel, and where the judge has confi-
dence that plaintiffs' counsel will not sell some clients short in order
to get a better deal for others in the same group.
A very different tool for attempting to break logjams bypasses the
lawyers and looks directly to the clients. Surprisingly, it was a group
of lawyers who first suggested to me the idea of removing the litigators
from the process and having the clients directly conduct negotiations,
using the court as an intermediary. The case involved a dispute between
a group of employers and agents of a union. Negotiations led by the
lawyers had produced nothing. Yet there seemed to be a feeling that
progress might be made if the clients themselves could speak directly
to a judge, in private, and hear his perspective on the positions taken
by each side.
Several factors seem to help explain the interest in having only the
clients work with the judge. The parties may not have had full confidence
in the advice they were receiving from their lawyers. They wanted
independent confirmation, and they would trust that confirmation more
if they heard it in an environment from which the lawyers were excluded.
A second factor was the parties' feeling that since they were professional
negotiators (as managers and union representatives) they deserved an
opportunity to see how they could do on their own. Also, each side
seemed to believe that only a judge could talk sense into the clients on
the other side, and that the judge's ability to deliver his sobering message
would be enhanced if the filtering effect of the lawyers was removed.
The procedure worked. After a day of sometimes emotional exchanges,
in a series of private caucuses, the parties managed to develop a
foundation for a settlement.
In another case, the parties' motive for suggesting that they meet
directly with me was clear. The chief executives of the two companies
77. For a general discussion on how lawyers should handle settlement conferences, see
Lynch, A View From the Trial Bench, in TRIAL HANDBOOK FOR CALIFORNIA LAWYERS
983 (1986); Lynch & Levine, The Settlement of Federal District Court Cases: A Judicial
Perspective, 67 OR. L. REV. - (1988).
78. Id.
79. Id.
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viewed their dispute as essentially a business problem and they felt that
they were more likely to arrive at a commercially sensible solution if
they took over the negotiations directly. They wanted to use a judge
as an intermediary because their relationship had been scarred by
distrust, and one of the executives felt that the judge's participation in
the process would add an extra measure of protection against being out-
negotiated by his more aggressive opponent. When I met with the
principals we negotiated in two formats: (1) face-to-face, with all three
of us present, and (2) in private caucuses, in which I met with each
principal individually, then played shuttle diplomat. The principals liked
this process and felt that it gave them an excellent opportunity to explore
options and explain concerns. They did not reach agreement in the two
sessions I hosted, but their communication paved the way for an eventual
settlement.
A judge should not be the first to suggest that clients work directly
with him and that the lawyers be excluded from part of the negotiations.
A judge who forces himself between a lawyer and his client challenges
basic premises of our system and creates great risks. One or more of
the parties may slip into viewing the judge as her lawyer, thus losing
her advocate without knowing it. Moreover, a client who views the judge
in this way may be much more inclined to sue the judge for malpractice.
In addition, the bar would justifiably resent a judge who interfered with
relations between attorney and client in this way, implying that the
judge could do better for the parties than their lawyers could. Judges
will virtually never know as much about the case, or the parties' situations
outside the litigation, as their lawyers do. For all these reasons, judges
should be very cautious about the circumstances under which they agree
to mediate disputes directly between principals, without the presence
of counsel. A judge who feels that a client is not getting good advice,
or who is afraid that offers or demands are not being communicated
to a client, need not resort to this device. Instead, he can meet with
that client in the presence of his lawyer, and in that environment share
with the client all the information he feels is appropriate.
2. Moving Outside the System: ADR. Judges who feel that they have
exhausted the procedural options available to them within the framework
of settlement conferences should actively consider suggesting some form
of alternative dispute resolution. In making such a suggestion, the key
is to first identify what the principal obstacles to reaching settlement
are, then to point the parties toward the particular form of alternative
dispute resolution that is best designed to overcome those obstacles.
Some forms of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) are specially
designed to attack problems in communication, such as mediation; others
are designed to generate new information, or a new perspective on old
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information, such as joint retention of a neutral technical expert; others
force the top-level decision-makers for the parties to confront a trial-
like presentation of the opposition's best case, then offer an opportunity
for those decision-makers to try to negotiate their own solution, such
as some forms of mini-trial and summary jury trial.
If there is no desire in one or more of the parties to search in good
faith for a reasonable solution, it may not be wise to press for ADR
in any form. If, for example, the obstacle to settlement is a party's
hard-nosed, self-conscious manipulation of its economic power, the best
course is to get the case to trial as quickly as possible. There probably
are relatively few cases, however, in which the real obstacle to settlement
is some ulterior objective that is immune to influence by information,
reason, communication, and improvement in levels of trust. It follows
that judges should be reluctant to conclude that any given case is beyond
hope of settlement. Failure to generate an agreement in a settlement
conference should not discourage the judicial host from considering
alternative procedures.
3. Devices of Last Resort. If sending the case to some form of
alternative dispute resolution does not seem to make sense, or if the
judge wants to play a few high cards before giving up on the settlement
conference format, there are additional tactics that could be employed.
These are last resort devices. They can backfire and result in an abrupt
termination of the conference. They can also damage the parties' in-
centives to continue to talk, or to look for other procedures that might
carry them to a solution. They should be used with caution.
If, after the judge has devoted a great deal of analytical effort to a
conference, a lawyer persists in taking a position that the judge considers
extreme, and that jeopardizes the negotiations, the judge might say:
"Well, I hate to say this, but it looks like we just aren't going to make
it. I seem to have run out of analytical leverage. I'm afraid you are
about to lose me as a resource in this process."8 0 If a party has a real
interest in settlement, fear of the collapse of the conference, and the
loss of the judge as an intermediary, can move that party to become
more realistic. In other words, a judge's thinly-veiled threat to stop
trying to help the parties can smoke out hidden offers or demands. On
the other hand, of course, there is a real risk that a litigant will not
be moved by such a threat and will agree that the conference should
terminate. Because this risk is real, a judge should not use this threat
until she has exhausted her arguments and patience.
Another last resort device consists of pressing one or both parties for
80. I have been surprised on several occasions that this kind of comment has made
an apparently intransigent party suddenly become more flexible.
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their real bottom line figure. Talking in terms of bottom lines is
dangerous. Lawyers and judges should avoid resorting to these figures,
or using this phraseology, until they have in fact exhausted all other
analytical and negotiation alternatives. Once that point is reached, the
judge might consider asking the side that he considers the more rea-
sonable - the side that is more likely to have a realistic bottom line -
to put that number on the table.
I used this approach successfully in a major case that pitted a large
corporation against professional negotiators for a labor organization. We
had tried several different approaches, but our search for common
ground had failed. Near the end of the second or third long conference,
I sensed the need for a breakthrough device. I met privately with the
attorney for the corporate defendant, and persuaded him that if he gave
me a bottom line figure that I thought was reasonable, I would do my
best to persuade the other side that (1) the figure was reasonable and
(2) that it really was the bottom line, that there would be no last minute
movement in it, and that unless the plaintiffs accepted that figure, the
case would be tried to judgment. The risks in this approach are obvious.
A lawyer who insists, through the judge, that his client will not change
an offer risks huge loss of face and credibility if he caves in at the
last minute (unless some major new development fortuitously offers an
excuse). The judge who vigorously attempts to persuade a party that
an offer made by an opponent really is a bottom line number also risks
loss of credibility if there is a subsequent change in that figure. Moreover,
presenting a bottom line figure can be perceived as a power play and
can inspire a defensive, rigid rejection. And, if the bottom line figure
is rejected, communication can stop altogether, making trial inevitable.
On the other hand, if well-represented people have worked hard at the
settlement process for a long time, and if at least one side has enough
confidence and common sense to put up a realistic last number, this
approach can break deadlocks.
In gearing up this kind of presentation, however, a judge first must
take care to have a thorough discussion with the party who would be
making the offer. The judge must be sure that the party understands
what he would be doing and the risks this kind of move creates. The
judge must be satisfied that the lawyer and the client who would be
putting the bottom line number on the table have thought the matter
through very carefully and are committed to going to trial if their
opponents do not accept the number. If the number the party comes
up with after this kind of pep talk seems unrealistic, the judge probably
should give up on this approach, urge the parties to take a break for
a few days, and resume negotiations in another environment. But if the
number seems reasonable, the judge then must go to the opposing side
and make a very vigorous presentation aimed at erasing doubt that the
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figure really is the bottom line. Few negotiators are likely to believe
that any number is really carved in stone. Thus, the judge who chooses
this course must overcome big hurdles. He must fight through cynical
assumptions about the posturing that tends to dominate negotiations of
this kind and convince the opposing side that the offer or demand being
presented as the bottom line is the lowest, or highest, figure that will
be put on the table in this case.
The judge might make a short speech that includes points such as
the following: "We have analyzed and negotiated this case exhaustively.
Yet we have appeared to remain at loggerheads. I have run out of
steam. So I have decided to try something unorthodox and risky. I have
gone to your opponent and pressed him aggressively for his client's real
bottom line. I have told him that if he comes up with a figure I like,
that I think is reasonable, I will try to persuade you to accept it. More
to the point, I have made it clear that I will tolerate no movement in
his number if he gets me to come in here and present it to you as his
real bottom line. He has persuaded me that this is the number above
which his client goes to trial. He and I think this is a fair and reasonable
number. Our goal is not to pressure you into a corner. Instead, our goal
is to try to get this matter settled, to break the apparent logjam, and
permit the parties to get on with their lives. Toward this end, I have
persuaded your opponent to paint himself into a corner. He knows that
he cannot change this number, once I present it to you as his real
bottom line. I have assured him that there will be no 'nickle and diming'
from this figure, that I will not ask him to make any adjustments. So
please do not view this as an opportunity to make another counterproposal
and to leverage him into a position where you make a few extra dollars.
I will not communicate a counter to him, because he could not accept
it and live up to the terms of the agreement we made when I persuaded
him to put the figure on the table. So this represents our last chance.
I honestly feel that the number is fair to both sides, and I very much
hope you will agree and will accept it. If not, there will be no hard
feelings. So let me give you the number, then give you time outside
my presence, to talk privately among yourselves about how to respond.
I hope you appreciate that I am doing this only because I think that
this is a case that we ought to be able to settle but that after all the
work we have put in there seemed to be no route to common ground,
other than this rather risky approach. I believe this offer is made in
good faith. I know that you will respond in a similar spirit." Then the
judge should present the offer and leave the room, so that the lawyers
and clients to whom it is directed can consider the matter privately, in
an unpressured environment.
There is a less risky variation on this approach that Chief Judge
Gerald Weatherington of the Circuit Court in Dade County, Florida,
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has used successfully."' If substantial efforts to help the parties find
common ground by reasoning and traditional forms of negotiating fail
to generate an agreement, Judge Weatherington asks each side if it
would be willing to give him its bottom line or top dollar figure secretly,
by writing it on a piece of paper that is for his eyes only.82 The judge
explains that he will not disclose these numbers to anyone.8 3 He goes
on to explain that he will use the numbers only to make a judgment
about whether the parties are so far apart that there is no point in
continuing to negotiate or are close enough to make it worthwhile to
take a break and then try again.84 He reassures the parties that after
he has read the numbers, he will communicate one of only two possible
messages: "I think you should continue working toward settlement" or
"It looks like you are going to have to try the case. '85 A party that
knows that there is a possbility that he will be called upon to negotiate
further, and to make additional adjustments in his position, might not
provide the judge with his real bottom line. But Judge Weatherington
believes that this approach induces most parties to give him a figure
that is close enough to the true bottom to serve the purpose of this
procedure.86
What should the judge do if the "final" numbers that the parties
submit in confidence (either in writing or orally) do not overlap, but
are not light years apart? He should not automatically assume that
there is no room for movement. In a case I handled some time ago
that ultimately settled for a figure in the vicinity of $1,500,000, there
was a $300,000 gap between the bottom line figure the plaintiff secretly
submitted and the top dollar figure the defendant secretly submitted.
The parties gave me these figures near the end of the fourth settlement
conference in that case (we had negotiated for at least ten hours over
the course of the four conferences). Despite the substantial gap, I sensed
that both sides really wanted to settle, and that even though the figures
had been described, when submitted, as bottom line or top dollar, there
was a possibility of more movement if both sides believed that there
was a chance of closure that day. Each side distrusted the other. Each
side also feared that because trial was still months away their opponent
would "nickle and dime" them all the way to the courthouse steps.
Each side wanted to put virtually nothing more on the table. However,
in talking privately with each side, I developed a sense that a fair
81. Address by Judge Weatherington at a conference which the author attended for
trial judges in Florida (1986).
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
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number was right in the middle of the two "final" figures and that we
had a chance of getting there. So I went to one side and said "I have
a good feeling that we can close this thing today. But to get all the
way home I am going to have to get some movement out of both sides.
If you will put "X" dollars on the table now I will use all the persuasive
energy I have to press the other side to agree and I think we will make
it. I really think that "X" is a fair settlement value. If you give it to
me, I promise that I won't ask you for another penny. I will tell the
other side that the offer of "X" dollars is good only for the next half
an hour. I also will tell them that I will not bring back any counter to
you. In other words, if you give me this number, I will make it clear
to them that this does not represent an opportunity to leverage a slightly
better figure from you. I will tell them in no uncertain terms that this
is it, that I want them to accept it now, and that because the figure
is fair we should end this right here and now. If they stall, I will warn
them about abusing the process and your good faith and will tell them
that I will make no further efforts to help them settle this case."
With considerable trepidation, the team of lawyers and clients to
whom I was talking fought through its distrust and agreed to make the
offer. I went to the other side and made my pitch, emphasizing that
in my judgment this would represent an eminently fair settlement, made
in clear good faith, and that it should be accepted. There was a moment's
hesitation, as the party to whom I was talking obviously toyed with the
idea of trying to make a counter. I jumped in, repeating that I would
communicate no counter, that after all our work I knew that the number
on the table was fair and I would not try to leverage the other side
up. The members of the plaintiff team looked at one another, nodded
almost in unison, and agreed to accept the number that was on the
table. We had a settlement.
I should emphasize that I would not have been as assertive as I was,
would not have made the threats to pull myself out of the process that
I made, and would not have refused even to communicate any coun-
terproposal if I had not already spent many hours with the case and if
I had not been confident that the number finally offered really was
fair. It was important to me that there were "big boys" on both sides,
fully capable of assessing the value of the case and of protecting
themselves in the negotiation dynamic. Because it was a commercial
case, pitting sophisticated opponents who clearly had come to the final
conference with well-worked out ideas about what kinds of figures were
acceptable, and because the case was informationally mature, with each
side knowing a great deal about the evidence and law, neither side
could offer any legitimate excuse for refusing to "fish or cut bait."
These circumstances made it appropriate to resort to the "last resort"
strategy described above.
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IX. STEPS TO ASSURE CLOSURE AFTER THE PARTIES REACH
AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE
Unfortunately, it is not safe simply for the judge to have the parties
shake hands and leave after they have reached an oral agreement in
his presence. Minds that appear to meet may not; and commitments
actually made can be dislodged by second thoughts. "Settler's remorse"
may set in and cause a party to attempt to retreat from an agreement,
or fights may break out later over matters that the judge assumed were
unimportant details. A judicial host should run through the following
check list at the end of a conference that appears to have concluded
successfully.
(1) Make sure that the persons making the commitments have the
authority to be making them and that there are no contingencies that
remain to be satisfied. If there are authority problems, or contingencies,
a judge must identify them specifically and set up a procedure to clear
them. If home office approval is required, for example, a judge should
fix the date by which it will be secured and order the lawyer for that
party to send him a copy of the letter from the home office that reflects
its decision. A judge should fix the date by which any other contingency
will be removed and order the party responsible for removing it to notify
him promptly in writing when the contingency is indeed removed. If
he does not hear by the date fixed, he should write to the lawyer for
that party and ask for an explanation.
(2) While all the lawyers and parties are still at the conference, a
judge should get as much of the substance of the agreement as possible
committed to a writing or on the record. I have a tape recorder in
chambers that I use for this purpose. I ask one of the lawyers to
summarize, on the tape recorder, the elements of the agreement and
the procedures that will be followed to execute its terms. Then I ask
opposing counsel to affirm the accuracy of what has been recorded and
to affirm his client's assent to it. It is especially important to get the
clients' commitments on the record when they have displayed an incli-
nation to overreach, to second-guess counsel irrationally, or to change
their minds without apparent reason during the course of the negotiations.
(3) Avoid leaving loose ends. Before the participants leave the con-
ference, a judge should make sure that there are clear commitments,
understood by all, about who will draft the agreement, when that person
will deliver the draft for review to the other side, when the money will
change hands, and when any other acts specified in the agreement will
be commenced and completed. A judge must be sure that there are no
misunderstandings about who is to pay the attorneys' fees and the
various components of "costs." I have seen large settlements threatened
because, after the conference, the parties disagreed about who was to
pay expert witness fees or photocopying expenses incurred during dis-
68
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covery, or about whether the money figure that was agreed to during
the conference included sanctions that the court had imposed earlier in
the litigation. Judges also should beware of latent potential disputes
about confidentiality clauses, releases of agents, subsidiaries, or prede-
cessors-in-interest, releases of undiscovered claims arising out of the
events that triggered the suit, indemnification for tax consequences, or
characterization of damages for tax purposes. It also is important to
have the parties reach a clear understanding about whether the settlement
contract will include an admission of liability or a clause expressly
declaring that neither the fact of settlement nor any provision of the
agreement should be construed as an admission of liability.
There usually is such an emotional climax when the parties agree
on the dollar amount of a settlement, and such a rush to leave, that it
is difficult to get anyone to attend to these kinds of details. Unfortunately,
disagreements about details can cause a much larger structure to unravel,
especially when the relationship between the parties is infected by serious
distrust. There also is a risk that parties who later develop second
thoughts about commitments they made during the conference will use
disagreements about details as excuses to justify refusing to be bound
to the settlement. So, even though the emotional momentum makes it
difficult to focus on such matters at the close of a successful conference,
it is wise to leave as little as possible to be "worked out later." By
taking the final step of committing people to complete specific tasks
by fixed dates, you improve the odds of prompt closure and foster a
positive momentum that discourages the parties from looking over their
shoulders and questioning the decisions made at the conference.
X. THOUGHTS ABOUT THE ROLES OF CLIENTS AND ABOUT How JUDGES
SHOULD INTERACT WITH THEM DURING SETTLEMENT CONFERENCES
Before discussing sensitivities that judges should develop about clients,
it is important to point out how lawyers can abuse their relations with
their clients during the negotiation process. The most obvious form of
such abuse consists of failing to communicate to their clients all offers
or demands, or all the elements of offers or demands. A judge who
suspects that a lawyer is not telling her client about all settlement
proposals should consider asking that lawyer for permission to meet
with counsel and her client jointly and, in that setting, to explain the
terms of the most recent settlement offer or demand. In this context,
it is not a good idea for the judge to ask for a meeting with a client
outside the presence of counsel. Such a request is likely to be perceived
for what it is: an attempt to intervene into the attorney-client relationship.
There are other means of ensuring that settlement proposals actually
reach the clients at whom they are targeted. One method is for the
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judge to ask that the posposal in question be committed to writing and
that the client to whom it is directed acknowledge receipt of the proposal
by signing the document containing it. The judge also might ask that
the target client write out his response or counterproposal on that same
piece of paper.
A more ambitious and riskier device for making sure that offers are
reaching the client on the other side is for the judge to permit counsel
for the offering party to make an oral presentation, in his presence, to
opposing counsel and his client. Such a presentation could be confined
to describing the elements of an offer or it could be expanded to include
analysis of the relevant evidence and law. Unless orchestrated thought-
fully, this procedure can backfire and offend opposing counsel. I once
tried this approach near the close of a conference in which I had been
privately caucusing with one lawyer at a time for hours. Defense counsel
told me that he was very concerned that his client's offers were not
reaching the plaintiff. He asked me to ask plaintiff's counsel if he could
make an oral presentation to the plaintiff, in the presence of his lawyer.
I asked plaintiff's counsel, who reluctantly agreed. The presentation
subsequently made by defense counsel began with a one-sided, heavy-
handed argument about liability and concluded with an unrealistically
low offer. Plaintiff's counsel was outraged, and said so in the presence
of his client. He said that the presentation by defense counsel was an
obvious ploy to interfere with his relationship with his client. More
specifically, he said, the presentation by defense counsel clearly suggested
that his (plaintiff's counsel's) analysis of the case and his advice to his
client, which were radically different from the views expressed by defense
counsel, were deficient and unreliable. Plaintiff's counsel resented this
implication. He resented even more the fact that it appeared that the
court endorsed this implication. Why else, he asked, would the court
ask him to permit defense counsel to make a presentation to his client,
but not ask him to make a presentation to the defendant? The presentation
also put plaintiff's counsel on the defensive; it provoked him to launch
intensive efforts to persuade his client that the presentation by defense
counsel was totally without merit. Needless to say, the conference did
not yield a settlement.
What are the lessons to be learned from this example? Perhaps the
most important is to be sure that there is balance in any procedure. In
this context, balance means giving both sides the same opportunity. A
judge who is going to permit any presentation should make sure that
both sides have an opportunity to make the same kinds of pitches to
their opponents. It also is a mistake, after a series of private caucuses,
to permit a lawyer to make a presentation that the judge has not
reviewed in advance and determined to be reasonable. A sloppy pres-
entation of a self-serving proposal will alienate the opposition. Thus, the
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judge should first review the content of each presentation in private
sessions with each lawyer to make sure that what they planned to say
is within the realm of reasonable proposals. Finally, it is important for
the judge not to invite an inference that the real purpose of presentations
like these is to permit one lawyer to step between another lawyer and
his client. The odds that such an inference will be drawn increase if
the judge asks only one side to make a presentation, or if it is clear
that the idea for making a presentation did not originate in the judge,
but in a lawyer for one side.
There probably are circumstances in which presentations by counsel
to the opposition might be very useful, but a judge who wants lawyers
and parties to consider this procedure as part of a traditional settlement
conference must proceed carefully. A judge who wishes to employ this
technique should explain that what he has in mind is similar in structure
to the "mini-trial.1 87 If the judge senses distrust, and if the situation
permits the judge to reconvene the conference on a subsequent date,
he could direct the lawyers ahd parties to some of the considerable
literature about mini-trials.88 After the parties and their lawyers have
had a chance to familiarize themselves with the literature, the judge
could schedule a telephone conference to discuss whether they would
like to proceed along these lines and, if so, how they would like to
adapt the process to their specific situation.
Another way a lawyer can misuse a client in a settlement conference
is by dishonestly casting the blame for unreasonable demands or in-
tractability on her client. Lawyers sometimes use their clients as excuses
for refusing to moderate their positions during negotiations, pretending
to have client control problems that they in fact do not have. A judge
who suspects that a lawyer is misusing her client in this way might
consider asking to have a joint meeting with attorney and client so that
he (the judge) can determine what the real source of the resistance is.
In such a meeting, the judge should not lead off by making a presentation
to the client. This approach would invite counsel and client to infer
that the judge does not trust the lawyer and is stepping between her
and her client. It is preferable for the judge to ask the lawyer to explain
87. The mini-trial procedure has been used successfully to settle many large cases
involving sophisticated corporate clients. See D. PROVINE, SETTLEMENT STRATEGIES FOR
FEDERAL DISTRICT JUDGES 76 (1986).
88. E.g., BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INC., RESOLVING DISPUTES WITHOUT LIT-
I IGATION, A BNA SPECIAL REPORT (1985); S. GOLDBERG, E. GREEN & F. SANDER,
DISPUTE RESOLUTION (1985); CENTER FOR PUBLIC RESOURCES, THE CPR LEGAL PRO-
GRAM MINI-TRIAL WORKBOOK (E. Fine ed. 1985); CENTER FOR PUBLIC RESOURCES, ADR
AND THE COURTS: A MANUAL FOR JUDGES AND LAWYERS (E. Fine ed. 1987). Cf. Lambros,
The Summary Jury Trial and Other Alternative Methods of Dispute Resolution, A
Report to the Judicial Conference of the United States in January 1984, 103 F.R.D.
461 (1984).
JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
to her client, in the judge's presence, the content of the settlement
proposal that opposing counsel has made and the reasoning that he has
offered in support of his proposal. If counsel omits important elements
of the proposal, or if her description of the reasoning that supports it
is inaccurate, the judge could make sure the full message is delivered
by saying something like this: "Ms. Jones [the lawyer], I don't mean
to interrupt before you have completed your account of [the other side's
proposal], but this might be a good place to mention [whatever she has
omitted or misstated]." By using this phraseology the judge does not
appear to be correcting or displacing the lawyer; instead, the judicial
host inserts the information he wants the client to hear without directly
challenging counsel. This relatively unthreatening approach gives the
lawyer an opportunity to save face with both her client and the court.
After satisfying himself that the client has heard the full proposal
from the other side, and a fair description of its rationale, the judge
might ask the client directly, but gently, for his reaction. Interactions
between judicial host and client in this setting obviously must be handled
with sensitivity. Because settlements are legitimate only if they are
consensual, and because judges are in a position to exercise considerable
influence over laypersons, it is important that the judge not appear to
be pressuring the client to accept any given proposal or to modify his
position. There is less risk that the judge will inadvertently give this
impression when he is dealing with a representative of a large institutional
or corporate client than when he is dealing with an individual who has
had little or no previous exposure to litigation.
Individual litigants will sometimes feel both out of their element and
over their heads.89 Some clients fear that they do not understand the
legal theories, the implications of the evidence, or even the procedures
of the settlement conference itself. These kinds of fears are most likely
to arise when a natural person is represented by a solo practitioner or
a lawyer from a small office and is pitted against a large corporate
defendant, represented by lawyers from a large, high visibility firm. In
this setting, the natural person client may feel especially intense pressure
to appear (to the judge and to the opposition) to be in control of the
situation, to appear to be just as tough or as formidable as he perceives
his larger, more expensively represented opponent to be. Individuals in
this situation can be very concerned about being "duped" or "taken"
by more sophisticated or more clever opponents. 90 Some individuals are
acutely afraid of selling their case too cheaply, or of accepting a proposal
that is too favorable to the opposition. At another level, independent of
89. Author's personal experience.
90. Id.
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the real merits of proposed deals, some people are afraid of being
perceived by the judge as being unsophisticated and of being "tricked"
into a bad deal by the other side.
All of these fears and suspicions tend to produce the same kind of
reaction: a rigid, sometimes pugnacious defensiveness. The natural person
client tries to protect himself from his bigger opponent and from the
things he does not understand by projecting an image of toughness, and
he tends to equate toughness with inflexibility. Thus, it can be very
difficult to persuade him to make adjustments in his position, or to
compromise in order to find common ground. These problems are likely
to be compounded if the individual perceives the judge as pressuring
him. A client who feels pressure from the judge may infer that the
judge is lining up with the other side, and a client who draws this
inference will feel an even greater need to protect himself, as he will
perceive "the whole system" to be lined up against him.
A judge who interacts directly with natural person clients should
take steps to reduce the fears and suspicions that can frustrate efforts
to reason toward an agreed disposition. It is imperative in this setting
that the judge resist any temptation she might feel to be intellectually
or emotionally aggressive with a client whom she perceives as being
unreasonable or obstinate. Such aggressiveness not only is inconsistent
with the judicial role, and thus improper, but also is quite likely to be
counterproductive. It is likely to cause the client to dig his heels in
deeper, to intensify his resolve not to accede to what he may perceive
as a conspiracy to deprive him of what is rightfully his.
Unfortunately, avoiding behavior that the client might perceive as
coercive probably will not be enough. The judicial host also should take
affirmative steps aimed at helping the client come to terms with the
fear that makes him feel the need to protect himself. The affirmative
steps I take often include the following. First, I make a "soft speech"
about my role in the settlement conference. This speech usually runs
along these lines: "I would like to share some thoughts with you about
how I view my role in this process. I consider it completely unprofessional,
and therefore unacceptable, to abuse the power of my position by putting
pressure on any party or lawyer. I certainly would resent it if a judge
tried to pressure me to do something I did not feel was fair. I know
that judges do not settle cases. Cases are settled by clients and lawyers,
when they freely decide on terms that each finds acceptable and
preferable to the expense and risk of going to trial. Decisions about
whether to settle, or what terms to propose, are entirely yours, and I
have no intention of trying to interfere with your exercise of your right
to make these decisions." I point out that "it is my job to help litigants
and counsel analyze their situations systematically and to develop a
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richer understanding of how judges and jurors are likely to react to the
positions they would be taking at trial. The taxpayers (among whom
you are included) pay me to do two things, both of which I take very
seriously: to be fair and to help people reason toward solutions to their
problems. The whole purpose of the judicial system is to replace fighting
with reasoning."
I close my "soft speech" about my role by reassuring the client that
"it sometimes happens that even after lots of conscientious effort by
all participants, we fail to reach common understandings or to find
mutually acceptable terms. I know that there are circumstances in which
reasonable people can disagree, in good faith. When that happens, I
harbor no hard feelings. I hold nothing against the parties or their
lawyers. As long as people try in good faith to reason together, I feel
that my efforts are well spent and the conference is not a failure. So
please do not worry if, after we discuss things, you cannot reach an
agreement with the other side or if your view of the case, and of what
an appropriate settlement would be, differs from mine. I know that I
have no corner on the wisdom market, and I lose no respect for people
whose reasoning takes them to a different conclusion than I would reach.
As you know, I will not be the judge who will preside at trial. You
also should understand that we have a strict policy that prohibits me
from telling the assigned judge anything about what is said or done
during the settlement negotiations. Other than learning through my
minute order whether the case settled or not, he will hear nothing from
me about what transpires here."
In addition to making this "soft speech," I take other steps designed
to make the clients feel comfortable and to improve their understanding
of the situation. I self-consciously strive to avoid using terms of art or
pretentious professional vocabulary. Instead, I try to speak in everyday
language and attempt to reduce the law's over-subtle concepts to their
common-sense cores. If called upon to explain any proposal that is on
the table, or that I recommend, I go out of my way to explain forthrightly
both the pros and cons I see in it and the reasoning that supports it.
It is a serious mistake to gloss over the "cons" of some offer or demand
that you hope the client will entertain hospitably. The client's lawyer
is likely to bring the negatives to the client's attention in any event,
and the judge loses precious credibility if he gets caught trying to divert
attention from or to understate such matters. If the judge squarely
acknowledges the negatives, the client is more likely to trust him and
to have confidence in his overall assessment of the proposal.
Similarly, it is important that the judge's explanation of the reasoning
that supports a particular offer or demand be sufficiently specific and
clear to assure that the layperson fully comprehends it. If the client
fully understands the reasoning, he will feel more secure. If he does
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not understand it, he is likely to remain suspicious, and may infer that
the judge is trying to trick or dupe him into accepting something that
cannot be supported. Of course, there are times when the reasoning
cannot be airtight, either because potentially important information is
missing, or because the judge is forced to guess about how some other
person or persons (usually a judge or jurors) are likely to react to the
available information. In these circumstances, the most credible and
therefore the most effective course happens to be the only course that
is consistent with the judge's oath of office: honesty. The judge should
candidly identify those places in his reasoning where he is forced to
make assumptions or judgments. He also should explain why he made
the assumptions or judgments he did. Whatever the case, the judge
should expose fully what he is doing. This full disclosure will enhance
the litigant's confidence in the judge's integrity and improve the litigant's
capacity to assess the reliablity of the judge's analysis and the wisdom
of any recommendation.
I also have found it useful to reassure litigants that my job in this
setting is not to pass personal judgment on any alleged behavior or on
any person, but instead, simply to serve as a source of objective data
or information that the parties may take into account when reaching
their decisions. When articulating my analysis of the parties' respective
positions, I strive to make it clear that my assessments do not reflect
my personal values. Rather, they are based on my understanding of the
relevant legal principles, evidence, and my experience with similar cases.
I have found it to be especially important to sterilize my assessments
of the credibility of competing versions of the same events and my
reactions to parties' claims about the value of various components of
damages. I never tell a litigant that I do not believe his story. Instead,
I point out why I think that jurors, generalizing from everyday expe-
riences and having no special knowledge of the circumstances, are more
likely to find persuasive the alternative version of the events.
The value of damages is a subject about which parties (especially
the party who suffered the harm) can have very intense and idiosyncratic
feelings. Moreover, because some kinds of harm are virtually impossible
to value objectively, there is an especially high risk that the judge's
assessments of them will in fact be heavily colored by personal value
judgments. Consequently, whenever possible the judge should refer to
results in other lawsuits to assess the value of such harms. For example,
if a party tells the judge that he expects a jury to award him a million
dollars for a soft tissue injury, it might be most constructive to respond
along the following lines: "I know this injury has caused you great pain,
and really has disrupted the quality of your life, but I think it is
important, when you make your decisions during this conference, to
know that the largest award a jury ever has made in this district for
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a soft tissue injury is $30,000, and that the average figure for such
awards is about $7,000. The way you calculate the value of your injury
may make good sense, but it is important for you to know this objective
data about the environment in which your case would be tried." If no
such objective data is available, the judge should frankly admit that
fact and acknowledge that his assessment of the value of the harm in
question is the product simply of a good faith neutral judgment.
XI. IF THE CONFERENCE DOES NOT RESULT IN AN AGREEMENT
Judges who are just starting out in settlement work should understand
that most initial settlement conferences do not result in settlements. It
usually takes two or more conferences to exhaust the possibilities. Thus
it is inappropriate for a judge to blame himself whenever a conference
does not produce an agreement. Rather, judges should anticipate that
a follow-up session will be necessary.
When any given conference does not produce an agreement it is
important for the judge to call everyone together and to thank the
parties and their counsel for their conscientious work. It is equally
important to discourage the parties from leaving the conference with
the sense that trial is inevitable and that this should be the end of their
efforts to reach an agreement. The judge should say one more time
that he thinks that this is a kind, of case that could be settled. Then
he should encourage the parties to keep talking and to acquire any
information that might help them reassess their positions. Finally, he
should make it clear that he would be happy to host a follow-up
conference. If there is any reason to believe that such a session might
be productive the wisest course is to fix the date for it, on the spot,
before the litigants leave. If the judge fails to take this step there is a
real risk that neither party will ask for a second session even though
both are interested. The parties might not ask for another conference
out of fear of seeming "too interested" in settlement or merely because
they get caught up in the eleventh hour momentum toward trial. It is
a shame to lose a chance for a settlement for these reasons.
XII. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, it is important to emphasize a point made at the
outset. No judge could possibly do all the things that this Article covers
in any one settlement conference. This Article is a smorgasbord of ideas
and techniques from which judges might try certain items, either as I
have presented them or by adapting them to fit their own tastes and
the needs of the situations they confront. I hope that in reading my
thoughts on these matters a good number of judges will be moved to
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reflect on their own experiences and to contribute their insights to a
continuing dialogue through which all of us can become more effective
in this important part of our work.
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